The Archive · 1939

WHY THE DELAY The speech of M. Molotoff, Soviet Foreign

Commissar, delivered in Moscow, touching upon the Anglo-French-Soviet conversations regarding the proposed three-Power antiaggression pact, delivered before the Russian reply to the latest Anglo-French proposals has been handed over, is taken as suggesting that M. Molotoff desired to appeal to public opinion in both France and Great Britain, as well as to the two Governments. If indeed he had that in mind it was a shrewd move, for most certainly in Great Britain there is already a very substantial proportion of th" public in favour of a complete defensive understanding with Russia, which might, if it came to a general election fought upon such an issue turn out to be a majority. The relations between Britain, France and the Soviet during the past two years has not been quite as cordial as they should have been. The exclusion of Moscow from the conferences at Berchtesgaden and Munich, unavoidable as that was in view of German determination to have nothing to do with the Soviet, was the culminating point in the partial estrangement which had been noticeable, for it denied that equality of status upon which Russia had every right to insist, and upon which her government is insisting no One of the mistakes which Mr. Neville Chamberlain has been making up to the present arises from a reluctance to grant Russia such recognition of equality, and the remains of a latent suspicion of the manner in which the Soviet would use it when granted. Fortunately hat particular obstacle has been removed by the devising of formule upon which it is reported there is general agree-[ment in principle, there remaining a number of minor points which still require clearing up, and while it is believed there is nothing in them likely now to bring these conversations to naught, there is still the possibility that with the manifestation of the completest goodwill an unconscionably long time may yet elapse before matters are brought to the much desired conclusion.

Mr. Chamberlain seems to be conducting his foreign policy with a backward glance towards Geneva, and the League of Nations, ably with the desire to give some lip ser-to the ideals for which that body stands, but it is only a shadow of its former self, from a political point of view, and, while it would be all very nice to be able to invoke the various Articles of the Covenant as authority for whatever steps may have to be taken in the future, it fits in ill with the present situation and future potentialities. The Rome-Berlin Axis has presented the world with a military alliance which, despite all the soft assurances of the dictators, is considered by the rest of Europe to be a threat to its peace. It is a combination which has discarded the principles underlying the Covenant, and is designed to be put into operation with the minimum of delay when such a step is considered necessary, if not actually to embark upon aggression without the slightest warning. The elaborate machinery for consultation, etc., in the event of a threat of war, might be all very well if there were likely to be time in which those threatened could consult, but there is now no prospect that this will ever be the case. There will be no time for discussions. They will have to take place in an atmosphere of peace, as a preparation against war, for the present situation clearly indicates that, on the drop of the handkerchief, the anti-aggression Powers will have to be prepared to fight just as com-potently as those who may have commenced hostilities. If the parties to the proposed anti-aggression alliance have to consult while any one of them is being attacked, if they do not immediately spring to common assistance directly the present menace is transferred into overt act, then the initiative may be left for a very uncomfortable period in the hands of the dictatorships until the others have found common agreement on the lines to be pursued. The only effective answer to the German-Italian Military Alliance is a definite and unequivocal understanding that immediately any one of the parties to the proposed defensive alliance is attacked the aggressors shall be subjected to an onslaught from all sides.

Any arrangement which cannot move with the same speed as the dictatorships is subjected to inherent limitations which must operate against the offering of that adequate resistance to attack, which alone can justify ihe system of collective security which is proposed. Should the integrity of Poland, Rumania, or indeed any of the countries which it is considered the German-Italian combination threatens, be attacked, the only possible answer to it would be an immediate resort to force by the proposed tri-partite understanding. Initiative must necessarily lie with the aggressor states, but, if their governments are brought to realize that the counter-stroke will be attendant upon no delays, they will be less likely to start trouble. Within a few hours of onslaught defensive attacks should be the order of the day, any understanding which fails to provide for such contingency is in the face of all the cir cumstances not only useless, but may prove worse than that. Through no fault of the democracies the Covenant of the League has been brought to naught. It is well that this should be recognized. The policies of Germany and Italy have forced into prominence the old question of the balance of power in Europe. That balance should be restored in favour of the peace-loving nations as speedily and effectively as it is within the genius of statesmen to secure, for it is obvious that talk will be futile once action has been commenced. That can be done by meeting Russia on the points which are at present outstanding, and if one of them concerns this continual eyeing of the League, that should be abandoned, In the event of an outbreak of hostilities the world will not be-faced with moral issues upon which Geneva might be able to pass academic judgments, but with the cold brutal fact of war, one in which initial advantages might decide its ultimate result. The situation does not permit of hesitancies and procrastination, but requires just that same brutal realization of the facts of the situation, as the dictatorships have.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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