Quite one of the most amusing pieces of cynical information which has been published in recent weeks is to the effect that Berlin is discussing a common German-Scandinavian guarantee of Finnish independence after the present Finnish-Soviet war is brought to a conclusion. The suggestion that Germany would join with Norway and Sweden in an undertaking to protect Finland from Soviet Russia, Herr Hitler's partner in crime, is all very well if der Fuehrer has in mind the ultimate reject tion of his infamous bargain with M. Stalin, but the picture of Herr Hitler guaranteeing' the Finns on one hand and maintaining the closest possible friendship with Russia on the other is just another of those things which characterize this most singular individual. It will only be necessary now for the Soviet to enter into an arrangement with Finland, guaranteeing the integrity of Scandinavia against Germany, to bring about lasting peace until either one or the other of the leaders decides that the time is ripe again to do something or other. Any such guarantee system with Herr Hitler a party to it would be worth precisely as much as so many of his other undertakings, and that not the paper it would be written on. What would happen if after peace has been secured M. Stalin decided again to invade Finland in furtherance of some more preposterous demands? Is it to be expected that Germany, engaged in the enormous struggle which she has brought upon herself in the west would embark upon hostilities in the north against the very enemy Herr Hitler seeks to avoid engaging simultaneously with Great Britain and France? At the best such a guarantee would merely mean that Germany might refrain from attacking Scandinavia if those countries went to the assistance of Finland in a second waf. Even that would not be sure, and, if either Norway or Sweden did in such circumstances go to the aid of Finland, they might very well find themselves just as completely betrayed as other nations have been by the indefatigable dishonoured of commitments at present at the head of the Reich. It is dificult to see what could be put in its place, in view of Scandinavian reluctance to permit Allied forces to cross their territory in going to the aid of the Finns, and it may be thought in the capitals of the three countries most closely concerned that it is the only possible protection available. Against that it must be remembered that for centuries the Russians have desired to have a port closer to the Atlantic than she has at present, and that the Norwegian coast is just as attractive now as it was when Russia first sought to expand to the west. M. Stalin may be reviving the policies of the Czars in his attempt to spread the world revolution of Communism. Germany might in some circumstances seek to prevent him, but that it would go to war with Russia for the purpose of protecting the Finns, no matter how deeply Herr Hitler pledged himself is quite unthinkable. It is impossible to trust the man and if either Scandinavia or Finland build much hope on such a scheme, as the one suggested, for their ultimate protection, and the safety of their integrity they will indeed be building on very unstable ground.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.