Earlier reports to the effect that the Russian peace terms for Finland were more moderate than those proposed last autumn have proved not to be correct. They are now shown to be more exacting than was at first believed, and considerably more onerous than it was thought Russia would ever make them. 'A more bare faced piece of grabbing has not been witnessed since Herr Hitler deprived the Czechs of their promised independence. There is this to be said for the Finnish Government: it faced up manfully to the realities of the situation, and accepted what even now appears to be the inevitable, fully comprehending that, doing what they have done has left them in a position to fight another day should that ever become necessary. They have been forced to cede an important portion of their territory, and to bow to other Russian demands, but they have not surrendered abjectly, but with full military honours. The terms of peace so far as they have been divulged do not require them either to deliver their arms to the enemy, or to engage in a programme of disarmament. Their armies and their equipment remain intact, for there are limits to how far even the numerically superior Russians can go in dealing with a people whose determination to face tremendous odds, and willingness to make every sacrifice for their country, have been the admiration of the whole world. They have lost territory, they have been obliged to relinquish vantage points of inestimable value to the enemy, but they have emerged rich in honour and glory, so rich that they must for ever shame the predatory nation which attacked them, and that other which rendered important if unobtrusive political aid. It was not Finland who asked for peace. It was Russia. Finland, as it has already been said, faced the realities and swallowed a bitter pill. What were those realities? They consisted of the facts that, firstly, the Scandinavian countries, because of the policies of their Governments, and not because of the wishes of the people, were reluctant in face of the German threat, to go actively to the assistance of Finland, and, secondly, that while the Allies were prepared to render substantial assistance in the shape of an armed expedition, neither Norway nor Sweden, for fear of the Germans, were willing to permit the passage of Allied troops through their territories.
There was one additional factor, which the Finns thoroughly realized, and that was that, while it may have been possible for the Allies to force a passage through Petsamo, the length of their lines of communication, continually under German menace made the value of such assistance highly problematical. It must be remembered, that in this connection Germany did not necessarily have to side openly with Russia in the rape of Finland to attack Allied lines of communication across the North Sea, for the fact that she is at war with Great Britain and France permitted her legally to do so, no matter for what reason Allied troops were on the seas. On the face of it the Russian Government has been somewhat adept in the terms which it has put forward. Concentration on the Karelian Peninsula, and the demand for Hangoe gives colour to the claim that after all she was only animated with a desire further to perfect the defences of Leningrad, and that that having been accomplished the rest of her terms were moderation itself.
On examination that does not appear to be the case. The insistance that this year Finland shall build a railway between Kandalashka and Kemijaervi is highly significant, for a more highly strategic line could not possibly have been devised. Such a railway would permit the division of Finland into two parts,—the operation which the Soviet troops so often and so vainly tried to perform,—on the one hand, while on the other it presents a direct spear thrust to the head of the Gulf of Bothnia at Tornea and would in the case of necessity bring Russian troops within easy striking distance of the first Swedish line of defence, the backbone of which is the line running from Lulea, through Boden, Gel-uvate, Kiruna to the Norwegian boundary close to the port of Narvik. There cannot be the slightest doubt that this particular item of the peace terms serves to place the Soviet in an infinitely better position when it decides if it does, to attack Sweden than ever before, and if the not too distant future shows that the Soviet has been laying its plans for the capture of the whole of the northern portion at the Scandinavian peninsula giving it an outlet to the Atlantic at Narvik and ports north, there should be no great occasion for surprise.
The seriousness of the position is fully realized in the Swedish press which declares that the Finnish-Soviet peace will be of short duration, advocating the formation of a military pact amongst the northern states as the only thing which can give them relative security in the future. It is not necessary as the "Social Demokraten" now contends to make it clear to all northern nations that Finland's affair is their affair, for they must have realized that long ago. The only question which now arises is whether any action they are likely to take now is already not too late. It is true that Finland stands unimpaired, comparatively speaking, after her fierce struggle with the Soviet, and that she would again offer resistance were another of the old familiar grabbing campaigns launched against her, but the question which must in all earnestness be asked is whether she, in view of what has happened, would be willing to join in a defensive pact in the operation of which she would be in the unfortunate position of having to receive the first blows. The lengthening of the Finnish lines in the southeast by the relinquishment of the Karelion Peninsula must operate to her disadvantage, and unless the Scandinavian countries were prepared to go into Finland to her assistance, and permit the Allies to traverse their own territories for the same purpose, it is difficult to see how resistance to any new onslaught upon Scandinavian integrity can be successfully fought. There can be little doubt that the events of the last three-and-a-half months have seriously prejudiced the position of the Scandinavian countries. That appears at all times to have been fully realized by the populace of the various nations. The respective Governments on the other hand appear to have been animated by a degree of caution,—periectly comprehensible in view of A Foul Murder The murder of Sir Michael O'Dwyer, former Lieut-Governor of the Punjab, the wounding of Sir Louis Dane, another former Lieut-Governor of the same province, Lord Zetland, Secretary of State for India, and Lord Lamin; ton, ex-Governor of Bombay, at a meeting in London of the Indian Association, suggests that the assassin intended to make a thoroughly good job of it while embarked upon the gentle operation of murder. Four men, closely connected at one time or other with the administration of India, were together at the meeting when the assassin opened fire, and the fact that all four of them were either killed or injured suggests that the man knew full well what he was about, and was endeavouring to commit an almost unprecedented assassination. That three of his intended victims escaped with no more than injury is entirely due to their good luck. The crime appears to have been dictated by a desire for revenge, for with the exception of Lord Zetland none of the victims are now actively concerned in the government of India, In, striking contrast with the brutality of this very heinous crime is the bravery of the plucky English girl, who despite the fact that the alleged assassin was armed, sought to throw herself in his way for the purpose of obstructing his flight. It is a remarkable thing that notwithstanding the number of times the British have shown malcontent Indians that they are not to be terrified by such things as assassinations from doing what they conceive to be their duty, driven home by a girl who acted up fully to the finest British tradition, these wretched people still cling to the belief that something can be achieved by murders of this sort. It is to be supposed that when the assassin has paid the full penalty of his crime which it is hoped he will do, he will be regarded as another of those martyrs who seek to gain their ends by terroristic methods and fail. That this particular crime was one of revenge is a possibility that is not yet to be discounted. It may not, however, prove to be the case, and if it is shown to be just another of those murders for political ends the people behind the assassin will probably have done their cause more harm than good.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.