Aug. 10.
The fact that the Ialians were able to occupy Zeila and Hargeisa so quickly after the opening of their attack on British Somaliland is merely indicative of the decision of the British command that the immediate boundaries of the colony were not the best adapted for defence. Consequently, when the enemy commenced their advance, the British fought a delaying action, inflicting. considerable loss on them, and escaping with little damage. It seems' as if the British forees will not seek to contest the Italian invasion until the high lands around Berbera, Some 150 miles from Zeila, are reached, for it ig reported that the terrain there is far more suitable for defensive fighting, and that there the numerically inferior forces of the British, though very superior in other direc~ tions, Will be able to hold and defeat the enemy. It has been pointed out that it would not have been sound tactics to have engaged the enemy along the British Somali land border, and it is a good argument that, throughout the war area in Africa, Britain' object is not the occupation of territory, but the defeat of the enemy's forces which cannot be easily reinforced. It, therefore, docs not matter where the ultimate defeat of the enemy takes place so long as it occurs. Obviously in such conditions as prevail in northern Africa the longer the enemy is oh aged to make his lines of communication, the belter for the British, who will take their: own time in deciding' when to take up the counter-offensive, In such a war of attrition, as that in northern Africa must be, neither men nor materials can easily be replaced, and in the ireumstanees losses in personnel and m: chines count infinitely more than any ad~ vance or withdrawal. If that is true from the British point of view it is equally so from that of the Malians. They are" not so good a position when it comes the maintenance of their troops in Somali land or Libya, for while the British fleet undoubtedly controls the Mediterranean, a fact which the Mahan Navy has not yet Sought to challenge, Italian troops in Libya. fare practically cut off from their home bases viees as are those in Ethiopia who cannot reinforcements in men and the wastage that fighting must inevitably entail. Hence the war of attrition. The Italians are obliged to fight th whatever material they may have accumulated on the spot. It must be taken for granted that the reserves which the Italians
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.