"The latest mail from Britain indicates that it is necessary to some extent to revise first opinions concerning the German invasion of Russia. Coming as such a surprise,—so complete that even Germany's ally, Japan, was mot apprised of "what was toward,—it was Originally believed that the concentration of large bodies of troops along the Russo-German border was but part of the usual war of nerves, and that the final decision to attack was something in the nature of an improvisation. Going back some months it was apparent when the growing extent of American aid to Britain came to be fully realized that Hitler would be in need of something in the nature of a counterweight. The only country which could possibly supply this was Soviet Russia, though the Germans fully realized that it was impossible to expect from the Soviet the same support as that to which Britain looked forward from the United States, and, because Stalin had never the same keen interest in a German victory as the United States had in one for Britain, he met Hitler's demands for míaterial cooperation by conceding the minimum.
Russia was not coming up to anything approaching the expectations which Hitler had of his trade agreements with Stalin, and for some months past there has been a tenseness between the two. Hitler desired an extension of Russian assistance. Stalin was reluctant not only because Russia needed most of what it produced, but also because a German victory over the democracies would lay Russia open to a German attack. It is now reliably reported that when he was dealing with Prince Paul of Yugoslavia last March, at a time when the latter apparently expected some support from the Kremlin, Hitler told him that his great attack on Russia was imminent, that his need for Russian oil, wheat and raw materials was great and that they would have to be acquired by force if that were necessary. The fact that Russian economy has not yet reached the point where the country could really be classed as an exporting one, meant that surpluses available for Germany would not be great.
"That was no concern of Hitlers. At the expense of Russia, if need be, he wanted the means of keeping his great war machine going, and, if Stalin could not be persuaded to deliver what was wanted peacefully, Hitler would endeavour to fill his needs by force..In all this there is something of the greatest significance. There is a suggestion that the reserves accumulated for what was once thought by the Germans would be a short war are in danger of running low. They are certainly not sufficient to carry on a long struggle, and the conclusion to be drawn is that, when Hitler failed in the Battle of Britain, he was brought to a realisation that his position would become exceedingly precarious as the months passed and that replenishment of his larders had to come before the final attempt to bring Britain to her knees. Hence the change in programme. There then followed months of endeavour to get Stalin to open his hands wider and give Germany greater assistance. Stalin either could not, or would not. The chances are that there was something of both in his attitude, and it is now clear that there could have been no doubt that Russia would be attacked, but only speculation as to when it would occur.
Hitler is consequently running two races at the same time, one the race against a failing war economy, failing because his original plans went astray, and the second against the development of an economy and a military machine equal and ultimately superior to his own, Russia cannot help him in regard to the second. Spoliation: of the Ukraine and the Caucasus may help him stave off the fatal day with regard to the first. The creation by the united efforts of Britain and America of a military machine and an economy vastly superior to that of Germany is but a question of time. Production in both countries is drawing towards the peak. Germany has reached and passed hers, but when the mighty efforts of the two great demo-crocies ultimately come into full operation there is no doubt as to the result. The invasion of Russia was not a sudden improvisation but a carefully planned change in Hitler's schemes necessary because he failed last autumn against Great Britain.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.