The report from Tokyo stating that according to the Japanese Press the Anglo-Japanese negotiations over the Tientsin incident will open today has not been officially confirmed, though it seems to be clear that they will open some time this week as was originally announced. They will not commence in the best of atmospheres, not only because of the recrudescence of incidents involving indignities upon Britons in Tientsin, but because of the fostering of anti-British feelings in those parts of China under Japanese control as well as in Japan itself, where the Japanese propaganda campaign aiming at the "enlightening of the Japanese people on Britain" has been started with a number of mass demonstrations. The fact, however, that any negotiations are being held at all is a sign for the better, though even here a great deal depends upon the degree of good faith with which the participants enter upon their labours, That to a very great extent will be tested by the precise formulation of the Japanese demands, and in this respect it has to be remembered that while various versions of Japan's requirements have been made public, emanating from the Japanese Army officials in North China as well as the provisional government in Peiping, the Government at Tokyo has not yet publicly set out the points upon which discussion is necessary, and until that is done it will not be known exactly what will be the scope of the conversations, nor will there be any prospect of being able to hazard much of a guess as to the prospects of some sort of understanding being reached as a result. One of the principal factors militating against the possible success of the negotiations is the intransigent attitude of the Japanese military authorities in Tientsin. The telegrams over the week-end suggest that so far from there being an amelioration of the situation, the tightening up of the blockade and the virtual stoppage of such essential supplies as coal and milk is gradually transforming the isolation of the British and French Concessions into a veritable siege, importing into the Tokyo negotiations a condition in which the British representatives have to carry out their mission under a threat.
The attitude of the Japanese military in North China has been made plain time and again. The latest utterance of their representatives pledging full support for the demands which have been put forward by the Peiping provisional government, the same old five demands which if granted would amount to practical surrender of nearly all rights in the two Concessions, is very much in line with the position they adopted when they unofficially made known their own requirements for the solution of the Tientsin issue, and there are grounds for believing that in the ultimate event the negotiations in Tokyo may in effect become almost tripartite between the Japanese Army an the one hand, and the British representatives on the other, with the Japanese Government more or less in the position of a mediator seeking to reconcile views which at present are almost, if not completely at variance. The British case at these negotiations is a simple one. It is possible to admit, nay impossible to deny that in this present struggle, the strictest neutrality should be maintained, a neutrality which offers no advantage to either Chinese or Japanese. It is contended, and there is plenty of evidence to support the view, that such a neutrality has been maintained. The Japanese military on the other hand deny that this is the case, but it is of significance that neither before the institution of the blockade, nor since those entering and leaving the Concessions have been subjected to rigorous search, has it for one moment peep suggested that concrete evidence has been discovered by the searchers to justify allegations. That is an important point to be remembered especially in view of the latest Japanese charge according to a telegram appearing elsewhere today, that the British authorities, obviously consular authorities are meant, are in direct relationship with the Chinese guerillas operating on the outskirts of Tientsin. Britons are alleged to be supplying guerillas with arms, and ammunition, and to be supplying them with information regarding Japanese troop movements. How they are able to do this, when it necessitates passing the goods through the Japanese searching stations, or going outside of Tientsin to watch what the Japanese military are doing, it is a little difficult to understand.
No one for one moment will believe that the British consular authorities would be so foolish as to indulge in anything such as the Japanese military allege, and there must necessarily be much speculation why these charges are brought forward at such a time as this. While there is, therefore, not much room for too much confidence regarding the outcome of the negotiations in Tokyo, the pessimism which has been already expressed may on the other hand not be wholly justified. Much depends upon exactly how far the Tokyo Government can exercise its authority over the Japanese military command in North China. If it can persuade the latter to accept that compromise between the British point of view and that of the civilian section of the Tokyo Government which seems to be the only possible solution of the whole matter, then it may be possible to arrive at some settlement. But the Japanese military are thinking, as soldiers so often will, in terms of unconditional surrender, and that has not yet, and probably never will come within the British purview. The latter requires the admission of, respect for and conservation of British rights in China legally acquired and properly maintained. Those rights cannot be surrendered, for it would mean the extinction of British rights in China, and ultimately the destruction of all those belonging to other third party neutrals. On that there can be no question even of compromise, but once those points are conceded it should not be impossible to come to Some arrangement whereby some portion of the reasonable section of Japanese demands can be met. Should the negotiations in Tokyo fail upon the question of principle outlined above the fault will not lie with the British, who cannot, any more than other nations concerned, admit that there is any justification for the contention that unilateral action by a third Power coming between themselves and China can modify existing understandings, and the rights and privileges derived from them. There will be no accession of strength to the Japanese case if these negotiations fail. The ultimate state of affairs may be worse than the first in that event, but the British can accept no responsibility for that, and may be confidently expected to refuse to o so.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.