While it is not to be expected that the British memorandum on the termination by Herr Hitler of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement will contribute much to the set~ tiement of outstanding differences between the two countries, the document is of interest as clearly establishing Great Britain's position viseivis of Germany. It is moderate in tone, and permits of no misunderstanding of what is Great Britain's policy, and the attitude she would adopt in the face of certain events occurring, Nothing can be clearer than the statement that the Government, far from secking to promote a war with' Germany, desires to establish Anglo-German relations fon the basis of mutual recognition of the needs of both countries, consistently with due regard for the rights of other nations. The Naval Agreement was regarded as introducing an element of stability in the relations be~ ween the two nations, avoiding unnecessary competition in armaments, but it contained provision for unilateral denunciation, and contemplated termination or modification only after mutual consultation, "The British position has never accepted the theory that recent developments in Europe justified the contention that there was no longer a basis for such an agreement, and it will be re~ membered that when Herr Hitler denounced it, a most painful impression was created. The Agreement itself was regarded as a signal proof that it was possible to reconcile Anglo-German views on that one subject at least; the British approval of the German exercise of rights provided by its terms demonstrated at least the readiness of Great Britain to make concessions 10 the German point of view arising out of naval develop~ ments in other countries, and there cannot be the slightest doubt that Britain was loyally adhering to the provisions of that im= Portant document, The importation of new considerations into the general situation, the new developments in Europe resulting, from what can only be considered as German aggression, led the British Cabinet to embark Upon a policy aiming at securing the greatest Possible degree of collective security against the further menaces which German action foreshadowed.
Though it is the German contention that the negotiating of mutual defensive pacts against aggression, and the extension of guarantees. to nations who were threatened with such action, were in themselves a threat to German security, It is quite apparent to the world at large that, even if it could be deseribed as a policy' of encirclement, it was only to become effective following action by Germany herself. The memorandum makes it clear that it is not the case that in whatever part of Europe Germany may be involv= war, Britain must always take an attitude hostile to Germany. That hostlily, it is emphasized, can only arise in the event of Germany committing an act of aggression, The responsibility for Great Britain becoming involved in a European war is solely that of Germany's, for so long. as she refrains from aggression there can "be no. question British intervention. It is unlikely that any single Power in Europe would wish to attack Germany. if it did, it would meet with the disapproval of Great Britain, but it has now been made perfectly clear that if Germany and its ally, aly, sock to further their torritorial ambitions by the use of armed force they will meet with the sternest possible resistance. The day of power polities has gone, gone it is hoped never to return, and the Sooner it is realized that the best interests of all would be served by negotiation fof outstanding questions "not under shadow of the gun, the better it will be for the world. One of the features of the Ger man policy of the last few years has been the endeavour to establish the doctrine that fusal to accede to each and every demand by Germany is a demonstration of enmity, That is obviously not the ease, andthe memorandum makes. it perfectly' clear, If friendship with Germany means the com= plete and abject uequieseence in. everything which Germany decides she wants, then there can be no friendship, but it there is on the German side a desire to negotiate in oan endeavour to decide what can be done 10
{ulfl her aspirations without infringing upon {ite rights of others, then there can not only be friendship but the prospect of a lasting 'The memorandum clearly contemplates the reopening of negotiations to reach another naval agreement, and invites information as to the scope and' purpose which the German Government would consider appropriate to such an agreement, but the real question is, wen Great' Britain desires to know now Germany would ensure that any action in the shape of denunciation or modification of the new arrangement during its term of
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.