One of the theories of warfare now being put seriously to the test since the intensification of the hostilities and their extension to Norwegian waters is the affect of air attacks on warships. For years supporters of the theory of aerial supremacy in relation to the navy have maintained that aviation developments have been so extensive as to outmode the usefulness of a navy, and that the era of naval power has ended, surrendering to the more mobile, cheaper and more effective weapon represented by the bomb carried by the aeroplane. Field Marshal Goering was one of the fiercest of the prophets, and claimed that Britain's control of the sea was at an end and no country pow should fear attack from the sea, An overwhelming superiority was accorded to the aeroplane and centuries of strategy and experience gained from the importance of sea power were thrown to the winds figuratively speaking. Of course, nothing of the kind has happened. In manoeuvres and experiments, in the Spanish war and in the present war the air forces of each side have done tremendous raiding work on naval units, and although in some cases large damage has been done, the results are nothing like what the prophets of air ascendancy over naval power predicted. For harrying purposes, the aeroplane is an admirable weapon and the raids on British and German naval bases and activities in the Norwegian fiords have proved this and nothing more. Naval power is still supreme and will continue to be supreme for there are so many elements in its favour. Attacks on isolated trawlers have been successful but when it comes to convoys and a concentration of strength the results have been fruitless. While British air power has achieved signal success in other fields, the German navy has been destroyed chiefly by British naval power. In an interesting article "The Dolphin and the Albatross" published in the "Nineteenth Century," Mr. H. C. Ferraby discusses this aspect of the hostilities and points out that an attack on a British cruiser squadron with its attendant destroyers would involve about 175 anti-aircraft guns putting up a fire curtain of various altitudes and the three lines of ships, with about a quarter of a mile between the lines, would cover about 14,000,000 square feet of the ocean but the area of deck space for target purposes would be considerably smaller and would represent an 86 to one chance against a direct hit. He adds that the results are not commensurate with the effort and points out: "During the Government's examination of the air versus sea controversy ten years ago it was accepted by the Air Ministry and the Admiralty that 43 bombers represented the capital value of a battleship. It will be seen therefore that the German air losses represent approximately half a battleship against which they can set no loss of either material or of fighting efficiency among our ships."
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.