While the Germans have undoubtedly made min progress in Norway there is no justificatheir claims that anything in the a decisive battle has either been
When considering what Germans have done up to the present it remembered that the initiative was they made, the surprise and the fact that the Allies have not yet been able to throw sufficient forces into the field, is the clearest hat they did not at any time a landing in Norway such as Ribbentrop has alleged, and indeed ition that they were not ready for venture. The first effect of the move was to ensure that those ports with adequate landing facilities would fall into German hands, and with the capture of Oslo, Stavenger, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik, the Allies were forced to resort to secondary ports ill-equipped with the neces-machinery to handle large bodies of and the heavy supplies carried with t has had two important results.
is the delay which the lack of involve in original landings, arises from the fact that such those which are to follow have out under extremely adverse conditions to which the activities of the Ger-arm undoubtedly contribute. The ition then since the Allies started to go to of the Norwegians is that they have working against serious disadvantages, the fact that they have done so well in circumstances gives every reason for regarding the future with confidence. There is also another ingredient in the situation of which account must be taken. The very culty in effectively co-ordinating the efforts of the Allied forces. That may be expected to disappear shortly.
To all this must be added the overwhelming strength which the Germans displayed in the air, That also is rapidly being counteracted by the Allies, and, as a greater degree of parity is reached between the opposing forces, the advantage which the enemy originally possessed may be expected to disappear. The German claim that,. because they have occupied the important railway junction at Dombaas, they control the principal railway line between Oslo and Trondheim is absurd.
They do not yet control the whole length of the line, and so long as the Allies occupy positions dominating it, it is to all intents and "purposes.useless.to them. It is not necessary to belittle the enemy's success, but it is imperative that it shall be placed in its proper ive. So also must the German advance from Roeros to Stoeren over the high and marrow passes through the mountains which separate the two towns. It is a feat, but, as a contribution towards the establishment of adequate communications between Oslo and Trondheim, it is not of any very great value. One reason for the speed with which the Germans are pushing ahead is because of the imminence of warmer weather which will reduce the roads to slush, and liberate the floods resulting for melting ice and snow, all of which makes the use of mechanized troops difficult in the extreme. That will also to some extent militate against the operations of the Allies, but as their first need is to see that sufficiently large forces are landed and well disposed for further action, the lull which will be caused by the climate should prove beneficial. Reports of fighting in the Skager Rak indicate that the Allies have again entered that dangerous area for the purpose of attacking German troop and supply ships. It should not be forgotten that it is by this route that Germany hopes to maintain her forces, but it has also to be remembered that the more men she places in Norway, the more vulnerable will this particular line of communication become. Indeed it may safely be said that until Germany finds another and safer route to Norway, which is obviously through Sweden, the German position in the Oslo district can never be considered absolutely satisfactory.
The claim of Herr Hitler in his bombastic order of the day addressed to the Reich forces in Norway that "thus the Western Powers' intention to bring Germany to her knees by a belated occupation of Norway has been finally crushed," is completely indicative of the manner in which he and his accomplices magnify even the smallest successes. Nothing is further from the truth than that the Allies have been crushed in Norway. It has been authoritatively stated em ime present no large bodies of troops have n in eonflict, and the process of sparring for position has not yet ended. That the enemy has had the advantage up to now cannot for one moment be denied, but they are certainly counting their chickens before they are hatched when they seek to magnify their achievements in the manner they are doing. The reason for this is the effect they desire to produce upon Italy and the other neutrals. The former is much more likely to be to enter the war on Germany's side if she can be persuaded of the truth of German claims in Norway, while the impression it is desired to create amongst the smaller neutrals is that Allied assistance is powerless against German might. The fact of the matter is that on land there has as yet been no trial of strength. The actions which have taken place in Norway, though they engaged in actions. of the first magnitude. Herr Hitler is only making a general "song and dance" about the whole matter for the Britain Not Napping The decision of the British Government to divert British shipping from the Mediterranean, and to oblige it to take other routes, is, in view of the situation, a wise one, for though it is hoped that Italy will sí keep out of the war, the fact that she might enter it at any moment makes it imperative that no opportunity shall be given her to make any successful attack on British vessels, It is to be assumed that France will eventually adopt the same procedure, which while it may have its inconveniences is undoubtedly the safest step to take. It has been pointed out that Italy's war strategy calls for sudden and overwhelming attacks on enemy merchant shipping before convoys can be organized. The step which has been taken effectually prevents that, and relieves the Allied squadrons in the Mediterranean of the necessity of providing such convoys. The fact that they can devote. their attention to the more active prosecution of- the war is a feature which should operate in the Allies' favour, for the blockade of Italy can be maintained quite easily at Gibraltar and Aden, while the further application of the navicert system should do comparatively little harm to the interests of those Mediterranean nations which may still desire to escape being involved in the struggle. All this has been necessitated by recent belligerent statements by Italian leaders and newspapers. Those utterances have been rendered the more significant by the refusal of the Italian Government of the French invitation to negotiate upon outstanding questions. It will indeed be unfortunate if Italy should enter the war, but it is a contingency which has all along been expected by the Allies, and taken fully into account when they declared war upon Germany when that nation invaded Poland. The British attitude towards Rome has been somewhat blunt of late, requiring that Italy should declare her hand, That she may do at any moment, though it is to be hoped she will not. Paradoxically enough the entrance of Italy into the war would in some ways benefit the Allies and particularly the effectiveness of the blockade. Italy has undoubtedly been a channel thróugh which contraband has been reaching Germany, and once she aligns herself with that nation automatically comes under the same sort of control.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.