The recognition of facts is the beginning of political wisdom, remarks the "Daily Express" in commenting upon the Tokyo formula, and it is as well that the truth of this saying should be realized by Britons in China.as thoroughly as it appears to be in some at least of the influential quarters in Britain. It needs to be remembered, when considering the protests which have been sent to London by the British Chamber of Commerce and the China Association in Shanghai, for if the abridged version supplied by Havas is truly representative of the whole document then a more mischievous message could not have been sent home as the alleged summing up of British opinion in Shanghai. They are fine, emphatic words which allege that the Tokyo formula amounts to a "betrayal of British interests and obligations in China," but what are the facts? The British Government on Monday gave specific assurances to China that the Arita-Craigie agreement did not condone the presence of Japanese troops in China, and does not represent a change in the British policy in the Far East. As this journal pointed out yesterday all that it amounts to is a recognition of a state of affairs which has been patent for the past two years, a recognition which the United States has accorded the situation for a very long time past. If there has been any mistake of policy it has surely been in refusing to accept the realities of a very serious situation, and it is better late than never to amend that error. That this has been done is a tribute to British statesmanship, and an assurance that it is not entirely bereft of political wisdom, the same type of wisdom that the United States Government has consistently shown. The declaration that the accord "indicates that Britain is abandoning her duty, obligations and legal obligations in China" which those responsible for drafting the telegram make, indicates the refusal to accept the very definite assurances which the Prime Minister has given, and which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has emphasized, and to suggest that they are handling the truth somewhat irreverently.
It will be seen that the two Shanghai bodies minced no words in their telegram of protest. The accord they regarded as "likely to result in the deplorable betrayal of British rights, interests and obligations in China," and in doing so demonstrated a complete failure to realize that the agreement in question does little if anything more than emphasize British neutrality which, in fact, has been in existence all along. The accord puts no limitations upon British rights under that neutrality, and to attempt to read anything like that into the document is to give meanings to words which do not exist. Equally rash it is to seek to find that "by implication the agreement recognizes that insults, and indignities to Britons in Tientsin, which were referred to by the Premier as intolerable, were justified." There is just about as much room in the terms of the accord for that implication as there is for an additional one that the moon is made of green cheese, and only by the most tortuous of reasoning can it be argued that a document which makes no reference whatever to those indignities contains any such admission. The above contention seems more an expression of resentment that an accord has been reached with the Japanese than the result of an impartial consideration of: a very simple document. It does not gio the slightest bit of good to read interpretation into documents, which cannot be justified by the words used, and are directly contrary to the assurances which have been given by responsible Ministers of the true intentions of the Government. Again the protest is said to contain the following passage: "Unless the agreement is limited by precise definitions, both the present and future of British operations in China will be subject to the control of the Japanese military, and will be dependent on their interpretation of the-extremely wide rights conceded to them." What rights have been conceded to the Japanese to which objection can be made? The terms of the accord are simple enough "H.M. Government in the United Kingdom fully recognize the actual situation in Chi where hostilities on a large scale are in pri gress, and note that as long as that state of affairs continues to exist the Japanese forces in China have special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order in regions under their control, and that they have to suppress or remove any such acts or causes as will obstruct them or benefit their enemy. H. M. Government have no intention of countenancing any act prejudicial to the attainment of the above-mentioned objects by the Japanese force, and they will take this opportunity to confirm their policy in this respect by making it plain to the British authorities and British nationals in China that they should refrain from such acts and measures."
Could it be contended, once the existence of hostilities is recognized, that it would be possible to deny the Japanese the right to take whatever precautions may be necessary for the protection of their forces? The contention of this journal that nothing has been done by this accord, which could not have been done with propriety at any time.during the past two years, is supported by not a few observers in Britain. That may be seen in the article of the diplomatic correspondent of "The Times" who writes "Last night, many of the shrewdest foreign observers in London agreed that second thoughts on the Anglo-Japanese were best. Nothing has been given away in the formula. It does no more than codify the state of affairs that already exists, and offers a basis. if used With restraint, for a modus vivendi in the future. Certainly it does not mean that Britain has committed in advance to agree to every demand that any Japanese commander in China may care to make." Reuter.
That this is so is apparent from the fact that, even in Japan itself, there is nothing in the nature of a unanimous welcome for the accord. Even the reaction in Chungking is not so vehement as the telegram of protest under notice, for it is reported that Chinese circles there favourably greeted the text of the Anglo-Japanese formula, principally because it was "better than anticipated." It is readily admitted that over so important a matter there must of necessity be a very considerable diversity of opinion, but it is suggested that the two committees responsible for this protest would have been better advised to have held their hand, until it was possible to obtain a better comprehension of the realities of the situafion, instead of sending a protest which in some respects indicates the breadth of vision of the three tailors of Tooley Street.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.