Nor can transport by road or by water be expected to solve Russia's domestic problems of distribution in the near future, let alone the problem of Russo-German trade. By contrast with the limited success of their rail and air programme, the Soviets have so far failed with their canals and roads. Of 260,000 miles of natural inland waterways in Russia only 70000 are available for traffic—and then only very irregularly owing to weather changes. Attention has therefore been fixed on the building of canals mainly for local distribution, but sometimes, as in the case of the Baltic-White Sea, the Moscow-Volga and the Volga-Don canals, to link up large inland areas with seaports. The results have so far not been remarkable. The traffic carried on rivers and canals did not reach the 1913 level of 48 million tons until 1933.
True, it had risen to over 65 million ions before the European war began last year, mainly through the increased carriage of timber, oil and grain, but even this increase compares unfavourably with the progress of traffic on the railways (see Table) The river fleet, which in 1913 consisted of 5,558 mechanically propelled and 24,186 other vessels with a total capacity of 13 million tons, had shrunk by 1936 to 3,070 mechanically propelled and 6,507 others, with a capacity of only 5% million tons. The average length of haul on the canals is only 830 miles, much less than the average railway goods journey of 432 miles; and, in the main, it is comparatively local traffic that makes use of Russian canals, the country's second line of transport.
A chief obstacle in water transport is frost, and the same is true of the roads, which are appallingly undeveloped. Frost—and floods—not only interfere with actual traffic on the roads. They also make the construction of roads extraordinarily difficult. Efficient drainage is next to impossible; and surfaces are quickly destroyed by alternations of frost and thaw. The Soviets claim to have 1,368,000 miles of "constructed" roads, But 1,146,000 miles are classified as "natural gravel" roads, while of the rest, registered as "made-up" roads, only a nfinute fraction (mainly in and around cities and towns) have surfaces akin to Western highways.
This is the background to the Soviets' well known policy of large-scale motor vehicle production, In 1937 Russia's output of lorries and buses was 182,000, giving Russia second place in world manufacture. (The United States produced 894,000, the United Kingdom 114,000 and Germany 63000.) But the roads to carry these Russian vehicles over any long distances simply do not exist. They can only be intended for local use and for the Army; and it is significant that the Russians have used vast numbers of motorized vehicles on the Karelian front in Finland, Even a bird's eye view of Russian transport facilities—no more could be attempted in a single article—shows clearly that the Soviets have not nearly solved their own domestic problem, despite over twenty years directed to that end only. For home use alone many thousands of miles of fresh railway track are needed, many more locomotives and goods wagons; a whole new river and canal fleet is required and a wholesale reconstruction of inland waterways and roads. Now, when the test of distribution beyond the Russian frontiers is being experienced, the strain is plainly severe. The campaign in Finland showed they were lamentably lacking on the supply side. Deliveries of grain and oil to Germany have been seriously hampered. There is an absence of adequate railway outlets westwards. There is an acute shortage of tank wagons. There are differences of gauge between the railways of Russia and those of her neighbours.
A determined drive with German aid to open the gates to the West might improve matters in time. Russia is no longer dependent upon outside sources for the supply of railway rolling stock and motor vehicles, though the Soviets asked the Reich for locomotives and railway equipment. The carriage of grain, feeding stuffs and, to a lesser extent, of oil could be increased and speeded up by water, No very efficient system of external communications can easily be attached to an inadequate internal transport system.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.