Last week was probably the most eventful ince the close of the Polish campaign, though en the western front there was comparatively little to report. It was in Finland, at Geneva, and the south Atlantic, where the most stirring events occurred, and, while none of them mark much of an advance towards the conclusion of the war, save, perhaps, only by reason of the flux of time, they have all interesting, and important bearings on vexed questions. Thus in Finland the Russians, after more than two weeks' heavy fighting, have made no great headway against the Finns, who are making them pay dearly in what after all can only be the preliminary fighting before they retire into their permanent defence works, the Mannerheim Line. At most points the Finns are entrenched some distance in front of it, but from the reports it is clear that the campaign is still one of movement and has not yet degenerated into the trench warfare which marked the greater portion of the last war. As the position stands at the present time Russian forces have penetrated the eastern borders of Finland to a comparatively small distance, and Soviet gains may be likened to a narrow strip of territory running inside the eastern Finnish boundary, and probably in no place more than thirty miles deep. Attempts by the Soviet Armies in the middle of the line to turn the Mannerheim defences have so far proved very costly, and unsuccessful, and, on the balance, the whole of the week's fighting definitely favours the Finns, creating no small surprise in most European capitals, and a great amount of "speculation as to what really is the fighting worth of the Soviet armies. Their performence contrasts strongly with those given in Asia last year and this, suggesting that the Siberian forces are better than those recruited and trained in European Russia, and the question is freely mooted as to whether Soviet military assistance to Germany, should it ever be given, will prove as valuable as the sponsors of the German-Soviet agreement would have the world believe. There is also the suggestion that, because of the exhibition which is being given, those German quarters which view Russo-German understandings with equanimity do so confident of German strength to wrest back what M. Stalin has grabbed, directly it becomes expedient to do so.
In Geneva the League Assembly voted for the expulsion of Soviet Russia from membership. No member state voted against the resolution, though a number refrained from voting, and instead of being carried unanimously, it is more accurate to say that it was passed ne mine dissentiente. It was at first thought that for-various reasons it would be impossible to secure the passage of such a resolution by the Assembly, and though this decision could have been taken years ago in other connections, and the League have vindicated itself much earlier than it has, the only sound opinion, which can be expressed on the matter is that, after all, it is better that the League should have acted even at this late hour than to have done nothing at all. It has often been said that had the League taken similar action in 1932 with regard to the Manchurian Incident the world might have been saved much of the suffering it has witnessed during the past seven years. That must always remain a matter of historical speculation, though supporters of the League, and all that it stands for, will be glad that even now there has been a belated vindication of the principles upon which it is based. Russia has contemptuously rejected requests and decisions of the League, and while the latter may be carried to no greater effect than they have at present achieved, the round condemnation of evil aggression stands out brightly amidst very gloomy surroundings. The League has appealed to members to give whatever assistance they can to Finland in her fight against Communism. Though not a member now, Italy marks her enmity to the Bolshevik creed by extending assistance to the Finns. Great Britain and France are doing likewise, and it may be before long that a large number of other countries will follow suit, though some, by reason of their close proximity to Russia, may cautiously refrain from doing so.
The naval action in the South Atlantic between the Admiral Graf Spee and three British cruisers, which, despite the fact that their quarry could throw much heavier metal and much farther than them, succeeded in driving the German vessel into Montevideo, has proved the most important one since the outbreak of war. Some time this morning,—there is an astonishing difference of opinion between the various news agencies as to when the time limit given by the Uruguayan Government really does elapse,.—the commander of the Admiral Graf Spee will have made his decision as to whether he will submit to internment of his vessel or proceed to sea, and fight the Allied forces which have assembled for the destruction of his ship. If he decides after all to accept internment no one will for one moment blame him. He and his crew undoubtedly put up a gallant fight, and there could be no question of his courage were he to decide upon saving the lives of his men and his ship. On the other hand he may decide to go out, and, realizing the odds against him, endeavour to inflict as much damage as possible upon his enemies. Or he may endeavour to elude the vessels which are waiting for him; in that he may be unsuccessful, but the prospect of being able to get free and inflict some more damage upon British shipping is a temptation not likely to be ignored. The shortness of the time given him to effect repairs suggests that he is being allowed only the opportunity to see that his vessel is seaworthy for the period is not long enough to permit of effecting repairs to damage done to the fighting equipment. If the Admiral Graf Spee does go to sea she will be at a disadvantage as compared with when she was first engaged by the British, and though the sporting instinct will regret-that she will be so heavily outmatched, it has to be remembered that such considerations cannot apply in war.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.