Now.
Two important telegrams ficant deductions mother column tory dealing ith the Mtalo-Greek war. According to the Daily Teleyraph" the Press has view of the control exercised by. Mussolini over Mahan newspapers, while the United from St Yugustavia, states that the Governor of Albania has urged Mussolini to replace General Ubaldo a Soddu, commander-in-chief - of the Italian forces, which have been thrown back from their "attempted invasion of Greece. If Mussolini adopts this suggestion this will be the second change in the Italian command during the very short time which has, elapsed since the Greek venture was first embarked upon. The attack on the Ttalian general staff is of the greatest importance. Its known that despite the fact that the leaders of the Fascist party were anxious fo embark upon a venture in the Balkans, the general stof advised against it, on the ground that because of the manner in which communications across the Adriatic could be threatened by the allied British and Greek forees, it would be dificult to maintain in Albania sufficiently large bodies of troops to ensure victory. In other words the general staff apparently realized as they have in northern Africa, with regard to the British, that an overwhelming numerical superiority would be rccessary if they were to have any reasonable hope of ultimate apparently not quite so wise as Hitler, who docs sometimes listen to the advice of his military experts, chose to note the representations which had been made to him, and ordered the invasion of Greece. The Italians met with resistance which was expected by the Ballan general staff, but not by the Fascist leaders, and, although a change was made in the' command.—involving the appointment of General Soddu, a better party man than a soldicr,—he failed to stem the tide, with the result that whatever prestige Italian arms might have accumulated in their campaign against the Abyssinians, and that was not very great, has been seriously diminished. Dictators must never fail. They must always be omniscient. Any failure that occurs must be due to the fault of some subordinate, such as the fifty or sixty high officers who were dispensed with as a result of the successful British air-raid on Taranto, Consequently, though the general stof gave expert advice against the venture into Greece, advice which the Greeks by their hardihood have proved to be absolutely cor= reet, it is now being forced {0 shoulder the blame, lest there should be criticism of Mussolini himself and the rest of the party leaders. The very fact that the Italian Press is allowed to come out into the open, star in the manner it has, clearly indicates, on the one hand, oficial inspiration, and,'on the other, the: big cleavage which is widening between the services and the Fascist party, and all this must be remembered in a country in whicl this war is by no means popular.
would indeed be premature to suggest that Mussolini is at present under anything. but a cloud, or that the day of his downfall is rapidly approaching. But his prestige has suffered a very grave blow. Even Mahan arms were eventually able to turn the tide that blow would still have been received, while, if the Germans ultimately. ind it necessary to extra yess into which the yyonius beck Carsar has plunged it, Mussolini's jon would be in no way improved. would not be surprising, however, if Hith decided to allow his accomplice to stew his own fat, for there are reports to the effect that even the German experts were opposed to this invasion which up to the present has had such tragic effects for the invaders, though there is always the pos~ sibility that Hitler, having already reduced Mussolini from equal partnership, might seek to place him under further obligation in order to deprive him of whatever claim he might have to his share of the sway which there might be in th past month as clearly justified those who have all along contended that in Moly is the Axis': we and that the proper strategy would be to strike at her savagely repeatedly. There is chance of quickly reducing of any other country at The Pope's appeal for pence, which was doomed {0 failure before it was ever the suggestion made i the House of Commons that it might be possible to arrange a 48-hour armistice ever Christmas. Mr.
Churchill made it quite plain that any such idea would be rejected, no matter from whom it emuinated. His rejection was per= it is hoped that be~ to secure 1 cessation of fighting. time that woolly-minded people came to the openly ' realization that this war ca not be fought out on the pri ples of brotherly love. It savage sten lo for existence ayainst one the most ruthless foes ich it ix possible to cancel which is prosecuting the war thout the slightest pretence to observe the other times have been respected, prosccuting it with an obscenity which is inconceivable except by perverted imaginations.
Admitting the Christian significance of the holiday, and as most ut the nations actually involved are of the faith, it would seem prima facie that there would be somethin, to for securing two days? surcease from But times have changed greatly since id could fight with a certain degree of grim courtesy. The tempo of war has Increased to such an extent that a stoppage for a couple of days might have an enormous military effect which from a British point of view might be. highly undesirable. Tt has 9 be remembered that only by continual bombing that much of the damage which has already been inflicted upon the enemy can be maintained. In many instances, especially with regard to oilway lines and' other means of communication, a respite of two days would enable the enemy to conduct highly desire able repairs, and oblige British airmen to do all over again work which they have already done. It is true that Britain would benefit, just as much as the enemy, but that is not entirely so, for whereas the British Isles afford the' enemy a compact target, objectives in Germany and occupied territories are spread over a wide area, Nothing would suit the enemy better than such a rest as is proposed. It would not be possible to effect a standstill agreement, and even if it were it would be highly imprudent to place any dependence upon what Hitler might promise. Thus while he would be able to go on with two days' uninterrupted disposition of troops and materials for what~ fever next he proposes to do, Britain could not benefit to the same extent, Again in the Balkans, a similar armistice would give the Italians a splendid opportunity. to despatch material, and reinforcements to Albania possibly placing them in a better position after such an interregnum to carry fon their struggle against the Greeks, That, of course, is providing the Ialians will be in a position to do anything much in that area in a month's time, for, if the Greeks carry on as they apparently are, the Italians will be lucky if by then they have not been decimated.
The only armistice which will be acceptable to the British Prime Minister and the people he is leading will be that one for which Hitler will ask a8 a prelude to peace, or, if Hitler does not ask for it, those who will by then have succeeded him, Tt is realized that these sentiments will not be readily accepted by those of gentler spirit, who would indeed like to see the anniversary of the birth of the Prince of Peace observed by the combatants, An armistice would benefit those who deny him at the expense of those who still hold steadfastly to the faith, It is necessary to. remember the hideous wrongs which have been in= Aicted upon the innocent at the behest of such men as Hitler and his accomplices, and to realize that it is only by the unrelenting prosecution of this war, without taking time out for sentiment's sweet sake, that it can be brought to as early a termination possible, A' Christmas armistice? No, better to fight on for one which will being peace in its train, and not a resumption of resent horrors.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.