The Archive · 1940

SPECIAL ARTICLES

AMERICA AND THE AXIS By Ssummsoxias

It is ivonieul that the greatest contribution making American public opinion aware of the threat to its own safety from the Axis powers shoul have been made by those powers themselves. The agreement signed in Berlin by Germany, Italy and Japan was immediately. interpreted by the American press as aimed primarily at the United States. For several years, in fact ever since 1937, Administration ofcials had pointed out the danger to the United States of the under= standing between Japan and the two European dictatorships, but had deen regarded as un= necessarily alarmist. Now confirmation for this oMelal view was provided by the three] partners themselves. ing aside the possibility that the main purpose of the pact was the mutual encouragement of the signatories, its intention must have been the searing of the United States into reversing. its policy of aiding Britain and China, by threatening war if it were carried out. The actual effect was just the opposite. Even the Isolationists disliked the assumption that they could be treated like a small Balkan neutral, while the Administration, confident of public support, Instead of retreating from their pro-Allied policy, carried it forward "with renewed vigour While the pact did nut imi any change in German intentions, it marked a definite change in German methods, During the early months of the war, Germany had done everything possible to soothe American public] opinion. American newspaper men and visitors to Germany were well-treated and every effort was made by Dr. Goebbel's propaganda organization to instil the notion that America had nothing to fear from Germany, that she had no designs whatsoever on the western hemisphere, and that any table of the contrary was probably inspired by Great Britain, Germany had always posed as a much wronged nation, seeking to rectify abuses imposed by the Versailles Treaty so wisely rejected by the United States Senate and driven to invade peaceful neutral counies solely because of information received That the British were about to move into those countries in order to attack her Similarly, Japan had protested that it, had no designs whatsoever upon the United States or its Far Eastern interests. Tu an exchange of statements which followed the German threats {0 the Low Countries. Japan. like the United States, declared its belief in the main= enanee of the status quo in the Pacitle.

One possible reason for the change of tone towards America was that all the Axis powers had realized that American opinion was no longer neutral. Soft words had failed. fo prevent a strong anti-dictator tide from sweeping over the United States. Perhaps threatening words would be more successful. In the past the Axis powers had always been able to rely upon the isolationists acting as: a brake if the Administration seemed to be heading towards war. By raising the spectre of war, therefore, they hoped to rouse the Iyolationists from their apparent quiescence. They did not realize that one of the reasons the isolationists were making less noise than usual was because there were fewer of them.

'A. series of blustering statements by Japanese spokesmen which followed the signing of the Pact was countered in Washing~ ton by a series of calm but significant acts. The Naval Reserves were mobilized, ican residents in the Far East were urged to return home and a series of naval staff talks took place in Washington. Admiral Richardson had flown from Hawaii specially for these consultations. ed with grim satisfaction the change the offleiat Japanese attitude when it became clear that they intended to call the Axis bluff. Even the reopening of the Burma Road was tweated by Japan asa matter of little consequence. Although the British Government was alone responsible for the reopening, it hed discussed the matter fully with the United States and only made its decision when confident that American policy would remain the same and would not attempt any compromise with the Japanese. The reopening was, in tael, treated in the United States as a Joint undertaking which formed but a small part of a wide and comprehensive understanding of Far Eastern policy which had been discussed frequently during the preceding weeks by Lord Lothian, Ambassador; Mr, Richard Casey, the Austra ian Minister: President' Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, 'A comprehensive review of the three power pact and its implications was given by Mr.

im Bullitt, former American Ambassador ince. He regarded i as something new ternational affairs. Nations had previously either remained at peace with other countries or declared war upon them. The ngrecinent signed in Berlin was not a declaration of war against the United States, bet "a contingent declaration of enmity." 1 was something like a time bomb which di hot. explode immediately and might never! explode at all But the only wise sovrse to Follow was to assume that it might explode and adjust the nation's policy according Mr. Bullitt elted in confirmation of _his opinion the declaration made by Prince Konoye, the Japanese Prime Minister. -After saying that he would like the United States to understand that the Axis powers were proceeding with "the construction of a new! world order" to which the United States could adjust its policy, Prince Konoye re~ sorted to 2 veiled threat: "Should the United States refuse to understand the real intentions of Japan, Germany and Moly, and persist in challenging them in the belief that the pact among them represents a hostile! lotion, there will be no other course open to them than to go to war!

Ambassador Bullitt interpreted this state~ ment as follows: "We were told that we must act in such a way as to permit Germany. and Italy to gain absolute control of Europe und Africa and to install a Nazi Government in Great Britain, and we must act in such way as fo permit Japan to gain absolute jeontrol of the Far Eust, or else the three totalitarian powers will make war on us."

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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