The sudden reappearance of the Deutsch-Hand (Luetzow?) opens up. speculation again fu Germany's so-called pocket báttleships—most mysterious of modern warships—and their róle in the present conflict, To understand both their design and their purpose one must go back to the last war—and the last peace. The post-war years saw a radical revolution in Germany's ideas in naval warfare; 1914-1918 had taught them a lesson, and the Versailles restriction limiting vessels to 10.000 tons made this lesson a necessity. NE
The German Navy, which had never fought a great war at sea before, had gone into the conflict with an idea of naval war closely modelled on that obtaining on land. The two opposing fleets, so the German naval officers believed, would immediately close in with each other, and in that struggle they were not without hopes that their own fleet, though inferior to the British by one-third, would be able to wrest victory from its opponent, in particular if they could induce the latter to give them battle near their own coasts and thus enable them to bring the full strength of their highly-trained torpedo divisions into action. When the Grand Fleet, instead of falling in with this plan, preferred to utilize their superiority of numbers and position to cut off, from their far-away base at Scapa Flow, the German overseas. supplies, without exposing themselves unnecessarily to the incalculable risks of battle, the German Navy, unable to break the stranglehold that was gradually choking the life out of their country, realized too late that what really mattered at sea was not the readiness to offer battle to your opponent, but the control your own and his vital sea communications. So deeply rooted, however, was this fundamental misconception of naval warfare with the German Admirals that to the end they were not able to shake it off.
The great revolution in the strategic outlook of the German Navy took place roughly between 1925 and 1930, long before the advent of the Third Reich. One of its chief exponents was the present head of the German Navy, Admiral Roeder. Analyzing the mistakes of the German commerce raiders during the world war for the official German naval history of that conflict, he had been deeply impressed by the opportunities lost (by Germany.
When the Nazis came to power, they were completely satisfied, in the absence of any naval strategy of their own, to take over a doctrine agreeing so closely with their own wish to avoid a head-on encounter and instead deal surreptitious blows at the enemy undefended spots. Hitler—great strategist as he believes himself to be on land—has contributed nothing new to German naval policy.
For this post-1918 policy We pocket battleship was ideal.' Now the point about the pocket battleships is precisely that they are not battleships. A battleship, as its name implies, is a ship so strongly armoured and armed as to be able to participate in a ranged battle between the main fleets of two opponents, upon the outcome of which the ultimate decision of the struggle for the command of the sea rests.
The pocket battleships, however, would be utterly incapable of ever taking part in a ranged battle without immediately inviting disaster, for neither their armament nor their armour will permit them to stand up for any length of time even to older types of true "capital" or "battle" ships. Though unable to stand up to a battleship in a regular fight they were, with their 26 knots, able to outsteam all existing ships of superior strength with the sole exception of the three British battle cruisers Hood, Repulse and Renown, while their relatively powerful armaments made them superior to any smaller craft they might meet escorting convoys. Besides this, their quite exceptional radius of action of
ocean for weeks at a stretch without the need fof refuelling.
The róle of the pocket battleships as super-commerce destroyers became more and more 24 clearly pronounced as, with the gathering of the political tension in Europe. Britain be-72 gan to replace France as the opponent against which the German Navy had primarily to devise their plans. Against France, the German Navy had believed in their capacity to maintain at least part of their own overseas communications. Against the overwhelming superiority of the British Navy that was utterly out of the question. AN their forces, therefore, were free for the attack.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.