Competent observers in Britain and the United States have been warning Japan during the last few days against following the example of Italy and entering the war on the side of the Axis under the impression that it will soon be over, that Germany will be victorious, and that a distribution of the British Empire among the conquering nations is all that will be left to be decided. Mussolini had the same impression during the critical days of France's collapse. From the outbreak of the war until the day he entered it, he had managed to keep about 1,200,000 French and Allied troops immobilized—a priceless aid to his master, Hitler. It is doubtful whether there has been any such instance of treachery by a neutral in the records of warfare up to that date. Enjoying the consideration of the Allies—in fact, almost preferential—treatment—Mussolini stepped in at what he believed was the last moment, in order to get what he could out of the finale. His miscalculation was that the collapse of France was not the finale by any means. Italy is now a defeated nation, beaten in Greece and in Africa, bombed at home and even invaded by parachutists. And observers in Europe see, rightly or wrongly, a parallel between the position of Japan at the present time and Italy in late May and early June 1940. Such a parallel is not strictly in line with the facts, since Britain, as the leader of the resistance to the Nazi menace, is very far from showing signs of collapse. On the contrary Britain has taken the offensive in the air and at sea, and is the cause of an unprecedented number of brain-storms and outbursts of temper in Hitler's premises in Berlin and in hís retreat at Berchtesgaden, which he finds more comfortable owing- to the air raids on Berlin.
The gestures towards Italy, made by Britain and France, before Mussolini brought shis country into the war, were construed in Rome as signs of weakness. They were nothing of the sort. It was not until it was shown that the German break-through over the Meuse was on a major scale that Mussolini had the courage to do more than make himself a nuisance to the Allies. The breakthrough occurred on May 12 and 13. On May 14 the Fascists staged an anti-Allied demonstration in Rome, burning a coffin draped with the French and British flags, outside the British embassy. The coffin was, of course, the symbol of the death of the British and French empires—and how false it has turned out to be! Thereafter, as the German advance progressed and it became increasingly obvious that the situation of the British and French forces in Flanders was becoming desperate, anti-Allied demonstrations in Italy became more and more violent. At this point President Roosevelt intervened with a message to Mussolini, urging him to keep Italy out of the conflict. The message was not answered for many days, and then only when Mussolini had cast the die and Italy was in the war. On May 18 the "Popolo d'Italia," one of the leading journals among the Fascist controlled press, said, in answer to President Roosevelt: "We regard ourselves in fact as having already intervened." On the next day, Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, declared in a speech in commemoration of the first anniversary of the German-Italian alliance: "Italy cannot remain absent from the present terrible struggle which will forge the destinies of the world." Concrete evidence that Mussolini agreed with him was given on May 24, the day that the Germans reached Calais in their drive along the Channel coast, when the Italians "postponed" the departure of all trans-Atlantic liners. On May 26 Mussolini conferred with the General staffs of his army and navy. The Allied position on that day looked hopeless. On the following day, the Allies made big concessions to Italy in regard to the blockade, which were not well received. President Roosevelt the next day sent another personal message to Mussolini, but he was too busy conferring with his general staffs to receive it. All the time, British and French ministers were declaring that no matter what happened the war would be continued until Nazism was defeated. As it turned out, the French assurances were not carried out, but Mussolini now knows that the British meant what they said. He had plenty of warning, plenty of friendly advice, but he chose to ignore it all.
It is possible that a somewhat similar situation is developing in the Far East. Though the tempo of events is considerably slower than those which occurred just prior to the collapse of France, there seem to be the same exchanges of warnings and threats in this part of the world as there were in Europe during the critical days of May and June. But this time the warnings are backed with a greater display of force, and the threats are received by an Empire which is strong enough to take them and ignore them. There should be no mistake made in the Far East such as was made in the Mediterranean by Mussolini. The latter had many more excusses for being deceived than have the states-Jnen in Tokyo today. It appeared to him then that the war was all but over. He could see for himself that the great power of France was humbled, if not almost exterminated. Britain stood to lose the greater part of her army, trapped in Flanders by a masterly German manoeuvre. That things did not turn out as they seemed to be about to do has resulted in Mussolini's débácle.
Instead of partaking of a victor's banquet, he has been forced to eat humble pie.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.