When the later fiscal loans were made after the Revolution of 1911 the Customs revenue, which had naturally suffered considerably from the disturbance of the country, was judged to be incapable of carrying further charges, or at least that it would have been unsafe to -rely Jenticely upon it. A fresh source of revenue had to be tapped to provide security for the new loans. This }was found in the Salt Gabelle, which {for this purpose was re-organized by the Chinese Government with foreign sistance in the manner described Memorandum No. 10. Under the} efficient administration created by} Sir Richard Dane the Gabelle pro-[duced a revenue exceeding all ex-Ipectations and provided the Chinese Government with three times the amount needed for meeting the annual loan charges. But so large!
proportion of this revenue is now] being seized by provincial authorities fand local military commanders (for period in the Spring of the present year the remittance of revenue to Peking ceased altogether) that the loans solely dependent thereon have As the British "secured" fiscal licans depend largely on the Chinese Customs revenue for their payment, it fs well to correct a very common misapprehension to the effect that the Customs revenue is monopolized {for the payment of China's foreign Jdebts. The latest figures show that Jout of a net collection of about 90 million dollars per annum, about 40 million dollars are going to the service of the foreign, and 35 millions to the service of the domestic debt.
Less than half of the net revenue is thus absorbed by the foreign loans.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.