If there were ever any misgivings amongst Britons as to the ultimate outcome of the war, the plain businesslike statement on the situation given by Mr. Neville Chamberlain in the House of Commons on Tuesday should serve to allay them. The speech was a model in understatement, and was couched in terms of great restraint, so vastly different from the loud-mouthed rantings in which the Nazi leaders indulge every time they fancy the German populace needs a little oratorical stimulation. The Prime Minister's reply to those who are urging a more energetic prosecution of the war is most convincing, for from the very commencement of the hostilities it was made clear that the British Government expected a long war, and his refusal to permit the Government to be hustled into unduly precipitate action was a very necessary refninder to those who appear to have forgotten how the dissipation of strength in too many theatres during the last war contributed so greatly to its pro-elongation. The tribute to Finland was well deserved, and did honour to a nation which has covered itself with glory, while the outline of the limitations which circumstances placed upon the amount of aid it was possible to give that country needs to be borne in mind when endeavouring to assess the responsibility for the fact that it was not greater. Mr. Here Belisha's criticism of the Government's policy vis-a-vis of Finland does not present him in a very fortunate light. He appears completely to ignore the difficulties there were in the way of despatching the assistance in men and materials which he avers was necessary, and leaves the impression that while he may have been a good organizer in the War Office he is not particularly sound when it comes to assessing the international situation as it was when the chance of assistance to Finland was likely to have proved productive of good. The very fact that both Norway and Sweden were reluctant to permit the passage of troops through their territory was of itself sufficient to render any such plan unworkable, and to suggest that willy-nilly reinforcements should have been sent regardless of the Scandinavian attitude is wholly to disregard the potentialities of the situation.
Despite these facts Mr. Chamberlain has made it quite clear that the Allies were prepared to do their utmost to meet Marshal Mannerheim's requirements, and were ready to give him not the 30,000 which he stated he would require in May, but a force more than three times that number. Whether it would have been possible ultimately to have sent such a force to Finland must always now remain a matter for speculation, though the German threats to Scandinavia make it quite clear that any attempt on the part of the Allies to send this force through their territories would undoubtedly have led to German intervention and consequently the extension of the war to still yet another front. Mr. Chamberlain's reference to the reported forthcoming peace offensive was short but timely. The Allies are not likely to be diverted from the purpose for which they entered the war, he declared, and it is, perhaps, just as well that this should be made clear now rather than after Herr Hitler has come forward with the alleged new peace proposals. Indeed it is to be doubted whether now he will do so. The Allies have made it so clear that they will persevere until they have attained the objects which they have in view that to launch a peace offensive at this juncture would be to invite just such another rebuff as Herr Hitler has consistently received since the outbreak of war, when he has indulged in the practice of endeavouring to sound out the peace market. The time has long passed since Herr Hitler could have peace. It disappeared when he gave the order for the German invasion of Poland, and will not return again until he is forced to a realization that the Allies are prepared to go on fighting until he is prepared to relinquish his ill-gotten spoils. The clap-trap of lebensraum, and the hundred and one catchwords with which the Nazi leaders bemuse their people mean nothing against the determination of the Allies that Europe shall not again witness the brutality with which the German military machine seeks to further the policies of der Fuehrer.
On the eve of the departure of Mr. Sumner Welles for the United States after his tour of the European capitals, Mr. Chamberlain's speech is of more than usual interest, because again he has enunciated the principles in defence of which the Allies entered into this war, and their common determination to see it through to the bitter end. Whatever there may have been in Berlin to impress him as to the German point of view, there can be no doubt in his mind as to the intentions of the Allies, and if he takes back to Washington an impression of the community of purpose which exists between Great Britain and France, he will be in an excellent position to advise President Roose-velí as to the chances of success which any early peace move may have. Prima facie they ars slim indeed, and it is perhaps as well that President Roosevelt should be fully apprísed of that fact. The Prime Minister placed the Scapa Flow raid in its proper perspective. The German claims as to the damage done by the bombing are shown to be nothing but the usual lies. They could not be anything else for as it has already been pointed out the German aviators could not possibly have known what damage they did in the dark. In this connection it needs to be pointed out that the British have made no claims as to the amount of damage done in the answering raid on Sylt. It would in the circumstances be ridiculous for them to do so for precisely the same reasons why the German claims are so foolish. But to return to Mr. Chamberlain's speech. What he said and what Lord Halifax said in the House of Lords is clearly indicative of the fixity of the Government's intention not to be diverted from the caus tious policy which they have followed up to the present, even if for the moment it leaves the initiative in German hands. The time will come when that will no longer be the case, but for the time being prudence demands that no steps shall be taken which do not promise immediate results. There is no reason whatever to believe that the Allies have lost anything by following the course they are, but every reason to believe that the Germans obtain little benefit from having the initiative left with them.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.