When Senator J. 'W. Bailey of North Carolina rose in the Senate to support. the Lease and Lend Bill for supplying Britain and her associates with American arms and declared, "It is not to be denied that the totalitarians may regard it as an act of war. What if they do?" he was voicing a feeling which none of his colleagues had-up to that oint dared express. During the Presidential campaign support for Britain had always been limited by the phrase "short of war." Less had been heard of "short of war" since the President held his epochal press conference which he declared that Britain was America's first line of defence and must be Jent American arms without any thought of cash payment, but nevertheless the debate both in Congress and throughout the country had often appeared to be.one between those who believed in "peace at any price" and those who believed in "war under no elr~ cumstances.' Between the two positions there was on the surface little. to choose for if the United States proclaimed in advance that the first consideration would always be to Keep out of war her ability to aid Britain was narrowly limited. (Mr. Roosevelt last week signed the Bill for appropriating the necessary funds—Ed.)
Even the former Ambassador to France, Me. William Bullitt, who had watched the Germans enter his beloved Paris and had been the foremost advocate of all out aid for Britain told the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "We are determined not to be drawn into this war. We leave out of the discussion therefore the policy of going to war although we know that the most cer= tain way to insure against the risk of British defeat would be for us to go to war. We set two limits on our support of Great Britain—fst we will not declare war; second we will not ourselves initiate military or naval hostilities." The determination "not to be drawn Into this war" gradually changed as the debate on the Lending Bill proceeded nto a recognition that if a choice had to be made between getting drawn into war and ceasing ald to Britain then for America's sale and for the sake of future generations of America's the choice would be war rather than an end of aid. The best way to keep out of war, the course which would involve east risk of war, was to see that Britain was strong enough'to keep the Axis powers at a distance. The best course after that to assure "American defence was, if Britain seemed Ukely to fall, to come to her assistance. This second possibility however is one which most Americans do not as. yet ike to face squarely, But only a short time ayo no American liked to admit that Britain was fighting his battle, she might be fighting for her own existence and for the safety of her Empire, but the war was stilt Europe's war and its outcome would make little differ= cence to the United States though her emotional sympathies were with England, 'The BIN was passed owing to an upsurging of sentiment for Britain of which the hard core' was a realization that the consequences of British defeat would be, disastrous for the United States. Mr. Bullitt's summary of the position in his statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee is brief enough to quote—"It is entirely certain that the shipbuilding facilities in the hands of the totalitarian Gictators would be at Toast four times as avert os our shipbuilding facilities and what we had planned to be a two-ocean navy would turn out to be a one-ocean navy after all, "A. Japanese iron ring round Asia and Australasia and a German fron ring round Aftiea and Europe, including Great Britain and Ireland would cut us off from trade with 0 great a portion of the earth that we, in a mutilated stump of the Western Hemisphere, would be thrown into economic disorder..., and we should have to try to support with our crippled economic system armaments colossal enough to resist the whole world The Lending Bill marked the third stage in American wartime policy and also the third stage in American opinion about the war, The changes in opinion were indifference over the outcome, the realization that American hopes for the future were bound up with British victory and finally the inten= sification of this feeling till little emphasis was placed on "short of war" and the motor ity of the country began to believe even if they did not state that the ald should be granted short of nothing. The changes in policy corresponding, to these changes in opinion were strict neutrality on the part of President and Congress, support for the Allies by the Pre~ sident and finally with the Lending Bill support for the Allies by both President and Congress.
The essential fact now is that, American opinion has begun to believe in "all aid to Britain irrespective of the consequences" and that Congress by a substantial majority has reversed its former policy of neutrality and impartiality and has aligned itself with the President "in opposition to one group of belligerents, the Axis powers. It has more-ever taken' this step in the nick of time for the President had reached the end of
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.