The announcement that the Japanese Election Committee proposes to put forward five Japanese candidates for election to the Shanghai Municipal Council will make this year's election the most important one ever held in the history of Shanghai. The straight issue is being put before the ratepayers of Shanghai as to whether the Japanese through an increase of their own numbers and the influence they may be able to bring to bear upon the Chinese members shall secure complete control of the Municipal Aaministrauon. For many years past tore has been agreement amongst the three principal foreign communiques in Shanghai mat the foreign members of the Councu snarl consist of five British, two American ana two Japanese. In recent times, because of the growth of the number of Japanese residents in Shanghai, there have been demands that the Japanese representation shall be increased. Such a "movement was to be noticed last year when there was much discussion as to whether the Japanese would put up at least one more candidate, but fortunately the matter was held over until a later date. With the nomination of five candidates for election, the position with which the ratepayers will be faced on election day is that they will have to select their Council from amongst twelve candidates. It must be stated at the outset that there can be no question as to the right of the Japanese to put up as many candidates as they choose. "here is nothing whatever to suggest that they cannot do so, and the fact has to be faced that they are making a determined attempt to secure what they consider to be their due as numerically the largest foreign community in the International Settlement. Should the Japanese succeed in electing all their candidates the position would be that the present international complexion of the Municipal Council would be very considerably altered, and in this connection it is interesting to note that Mr. Yukichi Hayashi, chairman of the Japanese Election Committee, speaks of this present development as a purely transitional one, paving the way for the ultimate formation of a council on broader international lines.
While it is possible to sympathize with the Japanese desire for greater representation on the Council, the argument that this can be completely justified merely by numbers is not likely to prove acceptable all round. Shanghai has been built up by Occidental effort. The enormous interests of Britain and America - vastly exceed those of the Japanese, as does also the amount of rates they pay, and it is clear that the equity of the whole matter cannot, therefore, be decided upon the basis of numbers alone. The predominance of Occidental interests requires that they shall have a considerable, though not predominating say, —which they do not even now possess on the Council as at present constituted,—in the administration of the affairs of this Settlement, and a complete bouleversement of the present situation is not likely to be productive of the best results. It would have been preferable if it had been possible to arrange matters by negotiation. This does not appear to have been the case, and it is only to be expected that the British and American ratepayers, and indeed all those who wish to preserve the maintenance of the status quo, until the question of representation on the Council can be discussed in a better atmosphere, will have to make up their minds as to what they will do. They will be' well advised to sink whatever differences they may have on the subject of Council affairs, and to see that every possible vote is polled in support of the Occidental candidates, for it is only by voting for the five British and two American candidates only, and no others, that there is a chance that the status quo can be maintained. Even then the contest will prove a close one, for it is only by polling practically the whole of the occidental vote that it can be hoped to maintain the present composition of the Council. The ratepayers have the matter in their own hands, and if they fail to do their duty as ratepayers they cannot hope to escape the consequences of the substantial growth in the number of Japanese residents.
The Japanese Election Committee have acted shrewdly in the choice of the men they have put forward as candidates. All five men are well-known and liked in the other foreign communities, and in other circumstances would undoubtedly attract considerable support. But the Japanese have forced the issue, and it is clear that the voting will be between community and community, in what may be a most imposing trial of strength. It will be realized that if the British and American as well as other ratepayers will be strongly urged to vote along the lines which are obvious, it will be because of no disapproval on personal grounds of any one of the Japanese candidates, for of their complete suitability there cannot be the slightest question. The point which has now become involved is one of principle. The British, American and other foreign communities not Japanese, owe it a duty to themselves to see that representation on the Council is in accordance with the size and importance of their interests in the port. The stake which they have is a large one, and while it is not suggested for one moment that a Japanese dominated council would willingly- adept any policy calculated to harm those interests, a greater feeling of security would be created if at any rate for the time being those interests were not deprived__of the protection which the present ratio of representation undoubtedly gives them. British and American ratepayers have a very definite duty before them. There is no guarantee that the three extra seats which the Japanese desire to obtain would of necessity be wrested only from the British. The American position is just as much at stake as is the tish, and the whole issue now is one as to ther the occidentals shall maintain their present representation on the Council, or whether it shall become predominantly Oriental. The poll will decide that, and it is incumbent upon every voter to see that his suffrage is recorded. That the Japanese will do so may, with their organization, be taken for granted.
Contraband Control Contraband control, part of the work of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, has received much attention owing to the number of vessels intercepted and cargoes examined. Extension of German blockade-running activities to the Pacific, where large purchases of materials, especially oil, rubber and cotton, have been made is likely to bring this sphere of the [Ministry's activities into even more prominence as the system operated in European waters has now been regularized. Results of this keen detection on war supplies which might conceive ably reach Germany have been published from time to time in terms of hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo intercepted, but in the working of this system it is not so well-known that in most cases which end in the contraband coi trol officers boarding detained vessels the manifest has often been under consideration long before the vessel reaches the control base. It is obvious that Germany had planned a long way ahead methods of running goods in neutral vessels through the anticipated British blockade, and therefore the process of examination becomes -all the more lengthy. All the details of consignors and consignees must be examined for some names are covers for firms with well-known German connections. If there are among the consignments goods in which Germany is deficient and of which the neutral country of destination has imported its usual figure then there is an a prion suspicion that the consignments will find their way to Germany. Refined copper and molybdenum supplies on the Soviet ship bound for Vladivostok but intercepted by the British navy apparently fall within this category. Statistical evidence alone does not always determine a seizure, but great care must oe taken in such a case to observe the disposal of the consignment at its destination. Preliminary investigation may show, on the other hand, that certain commodities are unlikely to be re-exported, and certain governments, to maintain their own legitimate supplies, prohibit some re-exports but re-exports are possibly under the terms of a special licence. All this work of detection is naturally lightened if neutral consigners make full use of "navicerts" as commercial passports for their cargoes. When preliminary enquiries have been made the case of the ship comes before the Contraband Com mittee which meets daily, In some cases, fu ther enquiries are made with British representatives abroad to ascertain the standing of various consignors and "Gonsignees for it is.only natural that with a war boom in neutral countries increased exports may be needed for manufacturing purposes. Side by side with this part of the Ministry's, economic campaign is the control of German exports for Hitler himself declared that "Germany must export or die," and the, stoppage of German exports is now beginning to take full effect. This, of course, reduces Germany's supply of foreign. exchange needed for expenditure abroad for imports and propaganda work. Therefore, statistics are no sure guide to the success of the Ministry's work. Germany's most important losses may well consist of cargoes never shipped, or applications for "navicerts" which are refused.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.