One remembers the ignominious bungling of our expedition to Norway, the collapse of France and Belgium, Dunkirk after which we actually had only four fully equipped divisions in England while Germany must have ad at least 80 just across the Channel, and why Hitler did not try to invade us then is one of the greatest of all mysteries; and that Italy then outnumbered us in the Mediterranean probably by five to one and in North Africa may be by 20 to one, and the danger to Egypt was very real. We have come through far worse crises than the Greek.
And there are consolations. For weeks, anticipating the probable loss of Salonika the Greeks had been carrying away everything valuable. What was left at the last they effectually dynamited or burnt. The Germans will have found no stores there of any kind and hardly any people.
The capture of Massawa too is a great mercy. It makes the Red Sea perfectly safe for American ships and as Abyssinia, now virtually conquered, can be handed over bodily to Bailie Selassie, large forces should soon be released from East Africa for service elsewhere. These are solid considerations to help us keep our feet on the ground.
But the time is at hand when we shall want a clear understanding with Admiral Darlan. It is pretty certain that the Germans could never have got their big reinforcements to Tripoli without using the protection of French territorial waters, and the Government has accurate information of the big consignments of rubber, fats and other much-needed war materials which Admiral Darlan is passing through Marseilles from French ships for the Germans. Darlan is described as being violently anti-British; he has never forgiven the sinking of the French men-of-war at Oran; he is very ambitious and seems to believe that the bread of hi. ambition can only be buttered on the German side.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.