June 3.
When it became known some days ago that the RAF, had had to be withdrawn from Cretan acrodromes the possibility that the British and Greeks would have to retire from. the island was fully recognized. Only three: airfields of the several to be found in Crete' were in operation, and the Germans were able to concentrate such superior forces over: them, that to get off the ground was itself distinct problem. The decision to conduct whatever air defence was possible at a di tance, even though this had patent disadvantages, was in the circumstances a wise one, tooth obviously the defending troops were not likely to receive the support from the air which was so necessary. Tne withdrawal of the air force was, therefore, the first indication that the enemy was likely to prove victorious in the battle for Crete. The scheme of the Germans was apparent from the outset: regardless of the cost, and it is Known that the Allied forces have inflicted tragic losses upon the enemy, they followed a policy of throwing men and yet more men into the struggle, sacrificing life in a manner which has come to be expected of them. Thus, large numbers of highly-trained men were sent to the slaughter by Hitler who simply had to obtain a success for the sake of prestige.
Despite the fact that the ROK. had to operate from distant bases, it was able to cooperate with the Navy to bring about the successful evacuation of the British and Al-ied forces from Crete to an estimated number of 15,000, though it is not yet certain that! the evacuation is complete. 'The views of a senior RAF, officer on the subject of par: chute troops are interesting. Using about 1,000 planes of which hundreds have been' destroyed, the Germans opened hostilities with parachutists, whom he describes as a "busted flush." It was not they who brought victory but the bombers and fighters which captured the aerodrome at Maleme thus enabling air-borne troops to effect a landing. Tt was those and not the parachutists who were dangerous. If the latter were not so successful in Crete as it was originally be-Yeved they would be, there is little reason to think they will prove any more efficient in other places"where areas are larger and mobility better. Consequently the one great lesson which is to be devised from the engagement in Crete is that supremacy in the air, even local supremacy is necessary for the execution of any project whether of offence or defence, 'The question will naturally be asked as to' why the land forces were not withdrawn at the same time as the RAF. The answer is plain, It was their mission to make the enemy pay dearly for their venture and to stave off their success as long as possible,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.