The Army's prodigious expansion since last autumn speaks for itself: 1,300,000 men put into uniform. 45 new cantonments completed or nearly so, a new Armoured Force (two divisions) now doubling, and soon to triple, many another example of conquered difficulties, great accomplishment, Against the physical. visible facts of that record, the sum total of delays and mistakes seems picayune. Army men need not blame themselves when they accept Secretary Stimson's estimate that they are of least a year from readiness for modern war.
The U.S. and its Army will be doing very well if that estimate is made good. If General Wesson's fears for delayed ordnance production are fulfilled, it will take more than a year to equip the Army. A! super-human best, peak production on most of the schedules already drawn will not be reached before 1942. Since aircraft production has first place on these schedules, the rest of the Army can hardly expect to fare faster or better than the Air Corps.
In February Secretary Stimson said that the Air Corps had nearly 4,000 planes. "Mr. Stimson had rated only 650 as "first-line" planes, and conceded that the Air Corps had none up to the battle standards of World War LI. About seven in every ten of the military planes now coming from U.S. factories are being exported, mostly to Great Britai At this rate, the Air Corps will be fortunate indeed if it is anywhere near equipped for war on its own by late 1942.
If Britain should fall, and all plane exports stop the Air Corps probably would get about two-thirds of the total U.S. production (the Navy would get the rest). Piling up aircraft on that basis from this month on, the Air Corps could expect to have about 8,000 new planes by 1941's end. Of these, a large proportion would be trainers; an unhappily large proportion also would be fighters whose proto types are already obsolescent in horsepower and firepower. By September 1942 (on present production schedules) the Air Corps would have perhaps 20,000 new planes—in numbers at least. a very respectable war force—plus the production necessary to replace battle losses and maintain an adequate reserve.
The Army has a vast problem in training men and officers as well as producing machines. Not till 1942 will mos: members of the draft Army have a yeír's training as soldiers. With shortages of equipment and of trained field officers the training of the men will probably be none too far advanced by then. Today the Army in the field is a great school force, whose officer-teachers themselves have to be Taught. Given equipment, given time, given competent command, the' job ahead can be done, but so far it has only been begun.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.