When American wartime policy can be Jooked at In historical perspective May 27, the date of the President's national emergency, fireside chat will undoubtedly stand out as one of the two great Iandmarks, The other out-Standing date was June 10 whicn the President abandoned strict neutrality and declared that the United States was wholeheartedly ide of those fighting aggression. On May 27 he went beyond the belief that the United States should ald those fighting ion, He accepted, the fact that jon was} threatening the United States, not merely Britain and other countries of Europe. The war was not a European war, but, a world~ wide war and since it. was world-wide the United States could not remain free from {te consequences, 'The United States was a supporter of the Democracies. She was a foe of the Axis, American safety _and security demanded an' Axis defeat, American policy' in the future would be directed Towards that end.
From the point of view of structural form the President's speech was not as clear and Jueid as some of his other speeches have been. He couched his policies in language which could command the maximum of support and
Ye-arrangement. of his. ideas' and a 1 cause the minimum of alarm. But a Penetration behing the: verbal patter reveal plainly enough the far-reaching, nature of Hit. Roosevell's conclusions. "The speech ebutous, but there ts biblical precedent for appointed some people because it was 'a nation being led by a cloud—and that nation Succeeded in reaching the Promised Land.
The speech was accompanied by a pro~ clamation which received fess attention than ie"'merited, "Its effect was to declare national emergency. But before the oper: tive clause was reached the reason why th country was faced th a national emergency £0 was concisely expressed. The first "whereas recalls the proclamation of limited emergency issued on September 8, 1939, "for the purpose of strengthening our national defence, within {ihe limits of peacetime authorisation." The second "whereas" points out that " the Objectives "of the Axis powers have been own. by events to be no longer those which they announced at the beginning of the war, Dut to "include the overthrow throughout the world of the existing democratic order and the world wide-domination of peoples and economies through the destruction of all re-Sistance'on land sea and in the al it had really taken the United States eight 1 might very pertinently be asked whether years of Hitlerism in Germany and 1% years of war to reach the conclusion -that the struggle was not after all a mere European conillet—a boundary dispute ora clash of rival imperialisms as the isolationists like say—but was an effort at achieving universal empire. The answer would have to be that the" responsible leaders of the American people fully realized the threat of Hitlerism fo the United States and clearly expressed it both in words and actions before war broke out, but after war broke out, felt compelled through fear of the political consequences to express_a different view. an et, on the Po assumption that the United States itself was not threatened. There had perhaps also been sense of embarrassment in proclaiming that America's future depended upon a British victory. It that was the true state of affairs then the American role of only giving limited assistance was not a dignified one for a great and: powerful nation, The weapons subsequently used against the "Axis were both diplomatic and ¢conomie, both positive and tive. Recognition was refused Axis conquests and the ministers of countries over-run_ (Albania and Czechoslovakia) were treated as still "being representatives of sovereign countries. When Jews were persecuted the Administ tion denounced the persecution in scathing] terms, recalled its ambassador from Berlin and initiated a committee to care for the political refugees. When the Axis attempted to expand its trade in Latin America the Administration met the attempt by disguised Subsidies from the Export Import Bank and the same time found excuses for raising the American tariffs against German foods. Countries opposed to the "Axis new order" were on the other hand the beneficiaries' of] the various reductions made by the Admini stration under its reciprocal tariff policy. The British and French Governments were fre quently urged unofficially "to be equally alive to the threat, from the Axis as the United States and adopt equally strong measures to thwart it. This polley of the United States, however, was only" possible politically because it involved no risk of war. The Netitrality Act made it obligatory for the United States to cease its attitude of partiality once war broke out between the Axis powers and Britain and France.
The President's national emergency speech, of May 27 marked a change in_policy. He returned to the pre-war theory that Britain and America were alike struggling against the same common enemy. The American programme had been based '"hard-headed concern for our own] security," the President declared. That was of course perfectly true, but it had not always in the past been presented in that light. Omeial "language had. at first been very neutral, then had emphasized the need for! aiding nations. which like. the US. believed in, democratic principles, On June 10, the President declared that Axis victory "would endanger the institution of democracy in the western hemisphere." But he did not say,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.