During the last few days there have been a number of reports from south-eastern Europe of an apparently contradictory nature On the one hand it has been made to appear that the Balkan Powers are being intimidated by Germany into falling into line with the schemes which have been devised in Berlin. On the other, there may be perceived a slight strengthening of the opposition which has up to now held up the planned Nazi drive into south-east Eurove. This drive was probably originally worked out on the assumption that the Italians would be successful in their offend sive against Greece. There seemed to be nothing on the books of the Axis Powers which would prove that this offensive would prove either difficult or impossible of consummation. The facts have shown that the book entries are not to be relied upon. Italy has most dismally failed in an area in which she was granted every chance of success. Italy has shown, as the proof has shown, as the proof has been reinforced by the debacle in Africa, that Mussolini is no more than a big town bully and an international bluff. Signor Gayda, the foremost of the Italian bluff-merchants, has had the impudence to declare that the whole of the retreat in North Africa was a part of a scheme to entrap the British forces in a desert area, while the Axis powers got busy on other fronts. That ie is to say, half the Italian troops were allowed to have been captured, killed or wounded, and huge quantities of war materials, for no other purpose than to persuade the British that they were winning. Nothing more can be said than that the British like this kind of trap. Ho"
If Hitler wants a quick decision in this war—and there seems to be little doubt that a quick decision is the only one which will do him any good—he has to attack objectives which will have a vital influence upon the well-being or otherwise of the British Isles themselves. This may be done in two ways: either by intensifying the submarine blockade, which is a dificult and costly thing to do; or by an outright invasion, which seems next door to impossible. It would appear to be almost a hopeless proposition to create a diversion outside of British waters which might seriously weaken the defences of the British Isles against invasion and at the same time enable the Axis to strike a blow in the Mediterranean which would enable them to keep the major part of the British defence forces—the Navy—engaged in duties not immediately connected with the protection of the British shores. The results of the fighting.in the Mediterranean before the Nazis came on the scene, may be briefly summarized as follows: the Italian battle fleet has been crippled, since the raid on Taranto; the Italian cruiser fleet, with its great speed, has been proved to be illusory, since the sinking of the Colleoni by H.M.S. Sydney—a much slower vessel—and the Italian submarine warfare has met with only mediocre success, owing to the fact that the crews of the submarines have not got their hearts in their work.
More than half of the Italian army in North Africa has been defeated and captured, and Rome claims that the capture has been a result of a "trap." The Italian navy has been virtually put out of action as a result of the Taranto battle, and the Italian claim that they still dominate the Mediterranean, can be ignored. In Albania, the best of the Italian army has been routed by the Greeks. The Royal Air Force has assisted in this rout, but the nature of the country indisputably puts the credit for the Italian defeat down to the Greek armies. In this battle the R.A.F. have played a vital part, but the Greeks themselves have won positions against the Italians, and there can be no question as to which force the greater part of the credit goes. There remain the prospects for the future. Will Germany invade Greece, after having overcome all the difficulties of the Bulgarian terrain? It is more than possible. But if this invasion is undertaken, even with the half-hearted ce-operation of certain Bulgarian elements, there can be no doubt but that the Nazis will have undertaken another task which will employ a large and important section of their army to another purpose than to prevent their adversaries from benefitting from that part of the world war. That is what is called negative strategy, and will be a proof that the Nazis are at the end of their tether so far as further embarrassment of Britain is concerned.
Spain's Position organized resistance to an ce Sha n the present wretched condi i
man army, now at the Spanish frontier, would unlikely and, therefore, if Hitler decides that such a move would be to his advantage all the Spenish protests in the world are not likely to stop him. With Italy now in a precarious position in Africa, and with the threat of resistance by the French armies in northern Africa hanging over his head, should he make any drastic move against France, Hitler must find ways and means of countering these factors. Use of Spenish territory appears to be a move that would not only give him bases from which he could ferry troops to Spanish Morocco in an attempt io overawe General Weygand and to prevent Britain from trensferring naval units from Gibraltar to Ceuta or some other place on the African shore, but he would be able to use Spanish Atlantic ports to attack British shipping. An attack on Gibraltar would be 2 costly affair, but Hitler might try to reduce the Rock in an effort to gain control of the vital Straits and of the central and western Mediterranean areas. Against such c move, however, there are many factors today. Hitler's army is so scattered that he cannot spare more than twelve to fifteen divisions or so for a Spanish adventure. A short time ago that amount would have been sufficient, but the latest news from the Mediterrenean theatre of war indicates that Britain, wise to all Hitler's worries, has greatly reinforced her forces at Gibralter, Malta and elsewhere in that area. Any move by Hitler would find strong, well. equipped British divisions marching against him, with a splendid Navy and Air Force to aid them. And, should he manage to gein a foothold in Africa without reducing the Rock, his position would be precarious indeed. Without the control of Gibraltar there could be no Moroccan move. That the starving and desperate Spanish people would rise in guerilla warfare also seems likely if Hitler decides to enter Spain, end guerilla warfare is really dangerous to a modern army, specially if communications are cut. Considering all factors—the widely-scattered Germen army, lack of naval power in the Mediterranean, the strength of Gibraltar, the massing of German troops in the Balkens, where a sudden move seems to be in the offing, and greatly-increased British strength among many others, there seems to be little Ukelihood that Hitler will attempt a major move in Spein.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.