Tr seems that the Chinese Government is again trying on an old game which has frequently proved serviceable, and which, though often exposed, still finds each time it is tried a set of men ready to be again deceived. The present moment, when an entire revision of the Tekin rates is being negotiated for at Peking, would seem inopportune for such an exhibition of the desire of the Government to withdraw from its previous engagements, as is displayed in the regulations for the new calling places on the Yangtsze and the recently opened port of Wenchow. It is, however, the time deliberately chosen by the Chinese Government to make still further encroachments on its treaty stipulations. We are all familiar with the history of previous difficulties with China. Little by little exactions were heaped up and obstructions placed in the way of intercourse, till at last trade became impossible; and some further step, insignificant in itself, became the occasion of actual quarrel. Finding, however, that war was a difficult game to play, the Chinese Government has tried the more congenial method of diplomacy, and has succeeded in getting back much that it lost by former ruder methods.—It was evident, however, that there must be something plausible to give up in the approaching struggle with the German -Minister, in order to avoid some still more unbearable concession. Were the game to be played out on ground occupied prior to the Convention at Chefoo, it was evident that something of importance must be pushed up to meet the extra pressure placed upon the Government. There were, unfortunately, indications of weakness in that instrament. It wanted that precision of expression which a Minister entirely in earnest should not have failed to have made use of; and one or two ambiguous words, capable, like the swords of the gate-keepers of Paradise, of being turned every way, were permitted to be inserted. This weakness and ambiguity in the instrument has been skilfully taken advantage of to the utmost, not so much in the hope of ultimate success, as with the object of the prior occapation of a position from which the skilful diplomatist may gracefully retire. The matter has been reduced to a simple question. The German Minister presses the Chinese Government for 9 certain amount of concession; that Government in the most liberal spirit accepts the position, and agrees that ata certain time it will be ready to proceed with the game. Meanwhile, it wilfully increases the mass of obstructiveness, so that there may be the greater ability to concede, and apparently the greater praise due for its ready acquiescence. It is something like an old trick with a too complaisant tailor. A. has an old score which the tradesman presses him to reduce. A. willingly accedes and names a time when he will settle the amount he can pay up; meanwhile, as he wants clothes, he goes to the tradesman and orders several new suits; when the time comes for payment he offers half the price of the latter towards a reduction of his debt. He has palpably done two good things. He has got his clothes at half their price; and has besides, by his readiness in meeting the views of the tradesman, effected a temporary release from the pressure which the latter was bringing to bear on him. He has kept his promise to the letter, and what could the latter expect more It was certainly the tailor's fault if he allowed himself to be "sold" by such simple device, and A could not be blamed by any reasonable man. So the Chinese Government, finding that something must be yielded, makes now aggressions in the hope that when the time comes for payment of the next instalment, a too alfable Minister may permit the last move to remain unquestioned, and proceed from it in his demands, rather than from the status ante quo.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.