In is curious that, although the Chinese Government does not hesitate to publish in the Pel: ing Gazette narratives of official corruption and misconduct that would go far to excite revolution among a less inert people, it rarely mentions military disaster. Whatever warlike operations are recorded, are always victories; generally the. surrounding and final extinction of some banditti, or the complete pacification of a disturbed district, At one time we used to hear occasionally of Tso Tsung-tang's progress in the North-west; how such a city had been captured, and a holocaust of the enemy slaughtered but we hear nothing of the campaign which is understood to be in progress against Turkestan, Scraps of news come occasionally from the other side, but with the exception of a memorial some weeks ago, from a General who complained of the exhaustion of the country in his neighborhood, of provisions, through the demands of the passing troops, we do nob remember to have seen a reference to the Viceroy's operations. Yet the reports from Central Asia indicate that fighting has been going on, and it is currently rumoured in Peking that some report of disaster in the North-west had to do with the sudden determination of the Peking Government to yield to Mr. Wade's demands in connexion with the Yiiunon mission, It would be very interesting to have some particulars of the movements of the Chinese Army, and of the condition and num. bers of the troops. It is generally believed that Tso has had altogether 180,000 mon under his orders, but that these have been reduced by hardship and disaster to about 40,000, of whom the majority are now practically besieged and neutralised. We hear of large sums of money being required for the North-west, and many of the arms of precision which are being bought and manufactured in such numbers are supposed to disappear in the same direction. But though a case of parricide or the appearance of a serpent ina mad bank are chronicled in the Gazette with marvellous detail, we hear nothing whatever. of the operations which all these arms and money go to support. It can hardly be that Tso has yet come in contact with the trained troops of the Ataligh Ghazee; though a late paragraph in an Indian paper seemed to indicate that encounters had taken place between his advanced detachments and the tribes between the Chinese and Yarkand frontiers.
We suspect the most formidable enemy Tso's army has to encounter, is really its own want of organisation, Tso himself is a fairly able leader as Chinese leaders go, with some know. ledge of warlike operations; but the absence of any scientific service from the Chinese military system hes led to frightful losses. Without a transport service, without proper stores, a large Chinese army is one of the most unwieldy machines that it is easy to conceive; it has to live chiefly on the country it occupies, and we may readily comprehend, in face of these difficulties, how great would be its sufferings if driven back on a district which it had practically exhausted on its forward march, Tso's men themselves are said to be of good physique, hardy and active; but with short pay, bad officers, and defective supplies, in a difficult country, we can imagine that their position is far from enviable. It is said that great efforts are to be made to recruit the army in Spring, from the provinces of Shansi, Szechuen, Hunan, and Hupeh; with a view to raise it if possible to 150,000 men. But with the Knowledge we have of Chinese muster rolls and inefficient organisation, we may very well doubt its attaining even neatly to that figure. We have often welt on the folly and extravagance of the expedition against Turkestan, and the experience of its promoters so far appears to justify our strictures, It involves expenditure which the revenue is in no condition to bear, and the natural consequences are the financial embarrassment and overtaxation which is depressing trade both native and foreign. To foreigners, there does not seem even the likelihood of success to justify it. Certainly, the Chinese are a persistent as well as a slow people, and they may succeed by weight of numbers in eventually overpowering their opponents; but when we hear of one General complaining that he has neither money nor supplies, and is at his wit's end to obtain either credit or food; and of another detachment surrounded and cut off in the Desert, we must admit that the outlook is not promising, nor the prospect hopeful of an early end to the drain which the effort is causing. We cannot but wonder at the obstinate folly which impels the Government to persist in an enterprise that must bea grave source of embarrassment, at a time when rest and economy are so urgently needed to restore its finances and enable the country to recover from the exhaustion of successive rebellions.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.