~_Bxaggerated statements have been made and absurd rumours circulated as to the number of troops General Kaufmann intends to employ the approaching expedition against Merv, As the point in question depends on the actual state of Russia's military strength in Central Asis, a glance at the official Russian turns of the army in Turkestan will suffice to enlighten the public mind as to the extent of Russia's power in marshalling troops on the banks of the Oxus. The inquiry is not wit! out practical interest, and the information thus acquired will throw light on Ru:
ents elsewhere in Central Asia as well in the direction of Merv, the year 1873 the army of Turkestan numbered 36,000 men. The annexation of a portion of Khivan territory, i gt delta of the Oxus, necessitated an addition of campaign that ensued with the Ru concluding with the annexation of the obliged the War Department to inet Turkestan army by 10,000 mon computation, at the same time that the garrison in Semi ak was doubled, In 1878 Kaufmann had, therefore, under his command, from the Aral to the borders of West Siberia and the Chinese Empire, an army of 55,000 mon, In 1878 Somirotobitak was farther reinfoi from Semipi i threatening aspect of the Kuldj and the most recent information poi conclusi inforcements kept th tion of rotchinsk garrison has been placed at the dis-of General Abramoff, the Governor of ava. A more important atop was taken ordering General arch 10,000 men from has_yet been spite General Kaufmaun's impationes, it in not probable that ao great an undertaking as the conveyance of that large body of troops accom the steppe would be attempted till the spring, The number of with what it has been rmy could spare for but it is impossi-blo to sve how any artillery could be sent from the two batteries—16 guns—which are all that General Krjibanoffsky has under his orders, As the Turkestan army had only eight field battories—64 guns—it ix that General Kaufmann would req. has been temporarily denuded General Kaufmana would then onl: army of 70,000 man and 80 guns to aw upon for active op ious beyond the frontier, The exact sition in which the Governor-General wi fied himself in April next can, therefore, be very accurately estimated beforehand, Unless Russia were to come to the insane determination to prosecute a great war in Asia with her European army, the numbers mentioned represent the extreme limit of her power in Turkestan. A small addi also be made for the military settler Zorafshan Valley and Somiretchina fe there do not number mo: 5,000 mon. For various reserve la" force of doubtful valu 1 Kaufmann would, therefore, have at his disposal about the same namber of Russian troops that there are of English in India. would not possess a quarter of our strength. There would, therefore, be in the comparison the whole of the Native Army to our favour. But the next question to be considered is what proportion of this army would it be to employ in an offensive war, which, piceetsful, would infallibly be followed by insurrections and ci within the Russian frontier? army is as much a garrison in English is in India. It has us and very difficult duties to perform. Its work is scattered throughout the various parts of a vast territory, and it has to maintain order among turbulent races, who sill remember that only a few years have elapsed since they were free and independent. To briefly summarize some of these dut there the first place, the line of the Syr Darya, with the forts Kazala, Peroffeky, Juelik, &., and the crossings at Chinaz and Hodjent, to be garrisoned. The cities of Tashkent, Samarcand, Jizakh, Khokand, Nam-avian, Andijan, Margilan, Vernoe, Naryo, and numerous others have all to be held in force, In Ferghana it is also necessary that there should at all times be a sufficient gar-risen to furnish s flying column in the event of any disturbance. In Naryn and on the Chinese frontier a respectable show of tree) has to be made; awed, Taking consideration, it would appear to be a very moderato computation to say that the following would be the very lowest number of meu required for purposes:—The line of the Syr Darya, 5,000 men; Tashkent neighbourhood, 5,000; Samarcand 5,000; the towns of Ferghana, 10, retchinsk, 10,000; Naryn, 5,000 Ainu Darya district, 2,000; or in men, leaving about 30,000 men available for rations south of the frontier. By an equally liberal arrangement, 60 guns might be sent with this force, Th" Russian official statements make it clear, how:
whole of this army will not ployed against Morv. A division is to tent into the tricts of Bokhs Hissar, and Kabadian—with the object of taking up a strong position in the neighbourhood of Balkh and Badakshan, This will probably muster 10,000 men, leaving 20,000 d say 50 guns available for the main outer-not probable that the expedition v will be of greater strength than ud to concentrate that force at will be " much more generally A portion will, no doubt, be conve) Kazala across the Aral,'and up the Oxus, while the main body will march from Samarcand through Bokhara, The labour of collecting supplies and transport at Charjui for 20 wany troops will be immense, and the history of Russia's military operations in Central Asia affords no precedent of how it is to be accomplished. In the Khivan war the invading army, of from twelve to fifteen thousand men in' all, advanced from five different points. One column was compelled to make & disastrous retreat, and another—that under General Kaufmann himself—nearly met with destruction. 'The successful columns had, therefore, four separate bases of supply, and' the largest body of troops moved {roth one point was only 6,000 strong. In the present instance the active army must follow two routes to Charjui—the one by the Oxus, which will be used by a column of the reputed atrongth of 5,000 men; the other through Bokhara, by one of 15,000 men, From Samarcand to Bokhara the 130 miles, and to Charjui 100 miles more. Much of the country to be passed through ie sterile, but, on the other hand, there are numerous villages and towns capable of supplying the wants of an army. It is probable that the march will be made by detachments, and that the whole force will not have concentrated at until the month of April is far ad-when the further march on Mery could be immediately commenced. Between Charjui and Merv there is but one direct route—l42 miles—but there are st the least three parallel tracks from Ilchak, Narizm, and Burdalik, places on the Oxus, to Merv of not much greater length than that from Eh The two last mentioned join the main route at Khalka, 35 miles from Merv, There was also some idea in Russian circles of sending a force across the desert from Khiva, by a way followed by a Khivan army in 1! The city of Kbi ly 260 miles di this route from Merv, and it is dently believed at the head-quarters of Gen eral Ivanoff, the Governor of the Ainu Darya district, that that distance could be accomplished by a lightly armed force in less than days. So far, therefore, og their inclinatious go, the Russian generals would like to attack Merv by several columne converging on the Turcoman stronghold as upon a common centre. 'To adopt that plan of campaign would reduce the transport and commissariat difficulties to a minimum; but, on the other haud, it would be full' of peril. An enterprising commander, even such a one as Near Verdi Khan, the Akhal chief, has already shown himself to be, would ask'for no better opportunity than that afforded by four or five detached Russian columns advancing through the sandy desert from Khiva and the Ox The valour and skill shown by the Turcoma: at Geok Tope most have inspired the Rus with greater onution in dealing adversary not wholly to be despised; and although water will have to be carried for the troops for the week's march from the Oxus to Mery, diGiculties of tr preferable to th di To the necessity of for the Russian corps must be added that of supplying the wants of the large Bokharan contingent—variously computed at 10,000 and 20,000 men—that i to take part in the en ign. Ibis allies, whose fighting value is problematical, and whose appearance in the field must untall a heavy additional burden on the issariat department. Probably the ice they can render will. be to Oxus, and thus m of communications, Their occupation away from the vicinity of Russian territory must aleo te the position of the Ri more secure during Ge1 val Kaufmann's absence.
'The Russian army in Turkestan, reinforced by 10,000 men from Oronburg and' 5,000 from Semipalatinsk, may therefore be capable of ring 30,000 men and 60 guns for an often sive war beyond its frontier. To this number be added about 20,000 Bokharan auxii ry. For the ims capture of Mery, force in amply sufficient, Probably an active and daring general would consider it much too numerous, and would prefer to make the attempt with 5,000 mounted infautry and a few batteries of flying artillery. It may alto be considered that the eastern corps, of which mention has been made, would be to establish Russian authority in Of, van urkostau, wore such a stop to be decided on, But this i ent power. Neither of the enterprises contemplated can be accomplished except with some loss and after enormous outlay would probably entail othe: disastrous cawpsign would lead infallibly to the outbreak of troubles within her own territory which it would take years to overcome, If it requires 20,000 men to capture Merv and to defeat the Turcomans, the Russian military authorities would show a wise caution before they strained their strength so much by concentrating the whole of their fora campaign the necessity of which is not apparent, and which, if not crowned with speedy and complete success, must have the most disastrous consequences for their Empi Asia. This summary of the present military strength of Russia in Central Asia and of the great obstacles to be overcome in an advance on Merv may serve to dispose of the rumours which have been circulated of the numb of the vast host to be collected for the operations against Merv. One writer had the temerity to compute it at from '100,000 to 150,000 ud it may be some consolation to have, mee of every wri competent to give an opinion, that, even were the Rh ian Government to take the step of sending 100,000 men from Europe, it would requi labour to carry it into execution. to attempt to march that host through th desert on Mery would be simply to disaster and failure.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.