The Archive · 1882

Chinese Policy in Corea

Ir we gange correctly recent advices from the North, the Peking Government seemed disposed to wash their hands of the Corean matter, in 80 far as they hold Li Hang-chang responsible for its speedy settlement, he having originated the line of policy which has culminated in the late crisis there, Our view is strengthened by the fact that the Viceroy's departure from his native province was some days in ndyance of the shortened period of mourning allowed him, and that he did of stay at Chefoo as at first intended. Chefoo was the scene of the astute Viceroy's diplomatic success in 1876, but it would seem as if he is not likely to inerenso his diplomatic laurels on this occasion, for a more complete exhibition of the " meddle and muddle" policy it is difficult to conosive than that inaugurated by Li with Commo. dare Shufeldt, which ended in the Corean tragedy of the 28rd July last. Both Commodore Shufeldt and Admiral Willes appear to have blindly accepted the statement of the that the Coreans were altogether pre. judiced against the Japanese, and Admiral Willes even went so far as to employ a Ohinese official as his interpreter instead of waiting for Mr, Consul Aston, his avowed ranson being that Mr, Aston came from Japan, While both these officers were playing ao completely into the hands of the Chines they were evidently quite ignorant of the fact, which any careful observer of current events was aware of, that there wore really two parties in Coren, tho-Progressive and the Anti-foreign, and that they were actually contributing towards the success of the latter Party, and; matter of course, to the defeat of the object they bad in view. No doubt the progressive party in Qorea was in a minority; bat it was headed by the King and his remarkably able Consort, the late murdered Queen, and was 1 slowly gathering strength, We do not accuse the Chinesoof aiding and abetting the late revolution, but we do think there is sufficient evidence to show that their representatives were indiscreet enough to go beyond the dictates of national rivalry, and to encourage a spirit of insubordination at a critical moment which has led to the late lamentable catastrophe. The difficulty of the Chinese position is apparent for they have, as we shewed the other day, to elect to support one or the other parties, and either course is surrounded with difficulty. But it seems beyond doubt that if they aot consistently they must support the imprisoned King, although doubtless their full sympathies are with the usurper's Party. Neither do we sep

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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