Tue latest advices with respect to the Annam imbroglio will put the Chinese Government into a position of some difficulty, The ultimatum of President Grévy is' one from which the French Government cannot possibly withdraw, and it is now for China to decide whether she will retire from the coutest or buckle to and make good her threats. If she elects to pursue the former course ber prestige will be ruined in the eyes of all her so-called depen-doneies as well as of the Chinese people generally, to say nothing of Japan and Europe. If, on the other hand, she means to appeal to arms, she will probably lose both prestige and power. There oan scarcely be any question as to the eventual result of a struggle between Franco and China; and although the French may find, at first, that their work is not 80 ensy as they may possibly have supposed, the defeat of China oan be no more than the question of a few months.
Bat there is a prominent figure in this country whose posi present moment one of more than difficulty morely. If it be true, as we have reason to believe, that Li Hung-chang has been placed in supreme command of the forces in the four Southernmost provinces, the measure is no doubt indica. tive of a strong and warlike policy having boon adopted at Peking. It is intended that China' shall accept the challenge of France, and that Li shall direct the movements of the Imperial armies, But Li is, and always has been, a strong and consistent advocate of peace, He assumed a rigid attitude of opposition three years ago, when the War Party were clamouring for the head of Chung Hou and the ce mencement of hostilities with Ru Ho told the Cabinet plainly that China was not prepared for war, that she was wholly unable to cope with any Earopean Power, and that any such measure fas the one that was then in contemplat tion would be an act of suicide. Of course there was an outery from the Censors. " Here is the man," they said, who has spent millions for many years in war-material and the organization of our forces, and now that the necessity for using them arrives he coolly tells us we are unprepared." We do not believe, ourselves, that China is to any appreciable extent better prepared for today than she was then; but i venture to tell ber 80? He is standing between the horns ofa dilemma. Should the Command. er-in-chief, as for convenience' sake we may now term Li Hung-chang, bravo tie indignation which would inevitably follow the repetition of so distasteful an announcement, and give his enemies the opportunity they long for, it is by no means certain that even his great influence would suffice to weather the storm. Should he, on the other hand, accept the responsibility, tempt the fortune of war, and not succeed in maintaining the military prestige of his country—as he will be expected to do—his position and prospects arescarcoly likely to be improved. Indeed, Chinese law takes a particalarly stern view of an unsuccessful gen-oral, regarding him in mach the same light as it regards an unsuccessful doctor. To decline and to accept the fauetions now thrast upon him will therefore be equally productive" of embarrassment, if not of danger, to Li Hang-chang. It is true that, pleading advanced years and domestic bereave ment, he might take the opportunity to retire altogether. But should the matter be prossed, the probability is that he will undertake the responsibilities of command, and use his utmost efforts to arrange the quarrel diplomatically meanwhile, If, however, the fates should be against bim, it la difficult, judging from his past career, to guess what his policy will Self-preservation will perhaps be its inspiring motive. That Li Hung-chang is an ambitious man there is not one tittle of evidence to show. It has, indeed, been a matter of some wonder to superficial observers that a man who has risen so high should be content to rise no higher. The Chinese themselves say that ho is now on the topmost pinnacle of power; there is only one step left for him to take, and were be to take that he would be no longer Li Hung-chang. Whether ho has ever bad an opportunity of thus oblitrating his own name in the blaze of a higher and more glorious one, we neod not now discuss; suffice it that if such aa opportunity has occurred he has never taken advantage of it, His close proximity to Peking has been at once his strength and weakness, Bat away, far away on the frontier of the south, with a great army at his com. maud, and a great question of state loft to his solation, he may prove a more formidable figure. If the coun-sols of Peking are wise counsels, Li is not likely, we think, to prove dangerous to the Manchus. But if he fails to give satisfaction to his Government; if he loses some decisive battle against the French; if h versaries obtain ascendancy in the North; if, as might be, there should be talk of deuling with him as there was talk of dealing with Chung Hon,—then few could blame him were he to show his teeth. There are occasions when men are forced to assume attitudes which under other circumstances they would never dream of assuming, and on such occasions the fate of an empire has often turned. There is no reason for supposing that Li Hung-chang is not among the most loyal servants of the Throne but when a man is put in supreme command of an enormous army, ata distance from the Capital which ensures his virtual independence, in the midst of provinces teeming with sedition, and, under such circumstances, is sub-his numerous enemies or an unpopular and unprogressive Government, it does not require any special gifts to foresee that the result would not be such as to conduce to the stability of the Throne, or ensure the domestic quiet of the Empire.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.