"Tue author of the Present Position of European Politics, Sir Charles Dilke, has begun a series of papers on military subjects, in the Fortnightly Review. Some of his statements as to the military power of England and of other nations, which were given in the former series, have been disputed in some cases, and in others it has been shown that he had overestimated the aggressive power of some countries. It was said, for instance, that he had placed the military power of Russia too high and that of Austria-Hungary too low, that in the former instance he had taken the figures on paper, and made insufficient deductions for the way in which the Russians forces are scattered; and as regards Austria-Hungary, the autumn maucuvres on that empire were considered to have shown that the army of the dual empire was in a much more efficient condition than he had described it. Notably, one military critic in Blackwood had pointed out mistakes into which Sir Charles Dilke had fallen, and had differed with him on very important points, and a considerable part of the new paper is devoted to refuting this writer, This critic, who was evidently an officer of the British army and thoroughly acquainted with his subject, was one of those who considered that Sir Charles Dilke had exaggerated the real force of Russia. Sir Charles Dilke retorts that we shall find unfortunately that this is not the general opinion of well informed English or foreign officers latest books, written both in friendly and unfriendly countries, upon the Russian attack upon India, laying down the proposition that we shall be unable to hold our own. Sir Charles Dilke also considers that he has rated the British power too high and the Russian power against us in India too low, and has therefore been in sume degree unduly favourable to our own position. We may leave this part of the aula' will be improved and strength-paper, confident that the defences of ened at least: as quickly and effectively as the Russian bability to undertake the attack. Sir Charles is very severe on the present Secretary of State for War for having reduced the horse} artillery, a meastire which was strongly opposed by all or nearly all the military members of the House of Commons and the greater part of the Service. He makes some curious statements about the British and foreign artillery. "It is impossible" he says " to produce such splendidly trained troops as our horse artillery without several years of drill. At the same time English horse artillery officers, like Bnglish cavalry officers, are a little inclined to underestimate foreign artillery or cavalry, as the case may be, on account of their dingy appearance." He repeat that our horse artillery force is probably by far the most perfect in the world, that its possession would give us an enormous advantage in the field at the beginning of a war, and that we ought rather to try to profit by that advantage than to take steps towards throwing it away. Italy is the last nation which has made a change in its artillery, by enormously increasing its horse artillery. French Stanhope, Napoleon III, reduced his guns and artillery horses in 1865, and although he increased them again in 1866, in 1870 he found that he had far too few." The English, who were the first to use field artillery, at Cressy, is now the hindmost. of the Great Powers in the arms which they invented.
The latter part of the article is mainly devoted to a consideration of what might happen to England if she went to war. Sir Charles Dilke will, he mention only Russia and Franc bable enemies, because Germa: interests at variance with our own, sufficiently important to be likely to lead to a quarrel, and "Germany, moreover, is entirely invulnerable by our forces, after she been stripped of these shadowy territories in New Guinea and in Africa, which it would not break her heart to lose." He does not think that the British public is willing to fight for Belgium, if that country were assailed by France. There are, or were when the article was written,—which was we imagine before Lord Salisbury had made matters at least temporarily pleasant with France—many questions on which a French Ministry might force England into war, And as Sir Charles Dilke says, besides those he former! considered there are others; the intrigues of France in Siam, for instance, while at any moment we may in his inion have to chouse between the rising of Newfoundland against ourselves and a war with our neighbour. Bringing Siam within the political visi of people in England may perhaps more attention to he paid to that part of the would, on which the same class of Frenchmen who brought about the conquest of Tonking have in late years been casting covetous eyes. And in regard to thi t ical future, there is the following sentence—" There have lately been warning symptoms upon the side of France to show us that jit possible that France will, with or without a Russian alliance, one day accept the loss of Alsace and direct her attention first to Siam and then to China, in the hope of founding an Indian empire more wonderful even than our own." Sir Charles Dilke writes as one who is behind the political scenes, and in a manner calculated to make his readers suppose that he has authority for what he says. But one statement in the article before us has already been authoritatively contradicted—that Prince Bismarck pressed Lord Salisbury this year to take a more active part in Eastern affairs, and was profoundly annoyed at the Premier's refusal to do
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.