Mr. Carnot's fifth letter to the Times on the Far Eastern Question appears in that paper's issue of the 20th of February. It is dated from Seoul, and is a compact retrospect of the political mutations in Corea from July, 1894, to the flight of the King to the Russian Legation, "All that can be said for the Japanese Mr. Chirol says. The next letter, we presume, will deal with the Russian ascendency that has followed that of the Japanese.
With reference to the Cretan Question, which was at the end of February and is still the prominent topic, the Times of the 27th of February has the following from its correspondent at Athens. Mf. Delyanni is the Greek Prime Minister In the course of an interesting conversation which 1 had with him to-day, M. Delyanni assured me that the decision of the Greek Goverment to maintain an army in Crete was irrevocable. Orders have been given to Colonel Vassos to remain in his present. position, to abstain from offensive operations, and only to act in case the Christian populations are threatened by Turkish troops or the native Mahommedans. Colonel Vassos is also instructed to refrain from any movement calculated to bring the Greek army into collision with the naval forces of the Powers. The Admirals of the combined fleet are now permitting the landing of provisions for the use of the troops and the insurgents, and therefore there is no urgent cause for the army to change its position. The idea of withdrawing it from Crete has never been entertained by the King or the Government.
On the other hand, Greece has no intention of proclaiming war against Turkey. Such a step would only be taken in case the Turks invade Thensaly or the Great Powers render the sition of the Greek army in Crete intol-No intention exists of invading and the Greek troops in Thessaly on the defensive. The Government anxiously desire to Iocalise the Cretan question and to prevent the present conflict rom extending in other directions. They have no wish to raise the Macedonian question or to embroil Europe over the partition of Turkey. No understanding exists between Greece and Bulgaria with regard to Macedonia. The Bulgarians propose to insist on the carrying out of reforms in that province in accordance with the Berlin Treaty, but the Greek Government do not believe in the possibility of instituting reforms in countries under Turkish rule, and cannot regard the proposal ina serious light. The Government apply the same principle to the case of Crete, where every effort at reform under Turkish auspices has failed. No other solution for the Cretan question is possible except the annexation of the island to Greece.
Each day of the week the first leading article in the Times deals with the Cretan Question, the writers consistently sup-essing every indication of sympathy with reece. On the 24th of February the Times was getting " little impatient at the indecision and inaction of the Powers, and wrote If the concert of Europe proves so ineffective in dealing with the affairs of an island which is easily susceptible of separate treatment, what are we to expect when the question of reforms in the continental dominions of the Sultan comes up for serious consideration There are many susceptibilities and jealousies which have to be taken into account when the general affairs of the Ottoman Empire are in question, but which need scarcely be aroused by a proposal for giving some kind of autonomy to Crete. Yet, so far as can be seen at resent, little or no' progress is being made in the joint discussion of a plan for reorganissing Crete, It fig trae that, Greece has complicated the situation and brought Europe fave to face with grave perils, A' consciousness of this fact has dictated the vigorous Jgnguage used by Germany and echoed in St. Petersburg, where the most rigorous measures are threatened unless Greece alters ber policy. But the want of a policy clearly defined and unanimously pursued by the Powers is at this moment a graver evil than anything that Greece can do. At least three of the Powers have to take account of popular feeling, which does not pay much heed to distinctions that seem important to diplomatists. Public opinion in England, France, Italy, and ina less degree in Germany, does not understand the coercion of Greece in the absence of a definite agreement to settle the matter in some It the Powers would come to some intelligible conclusion as to the solution of the Cretan difficulty, then they might order Greece to stand aside' with general concurrence. But at present the difficulty is that they ask Greece to abstain from meddling, without showing that they have any remedy to apply when she withdraws. It is this failure to fu isolated and local question, that at the pre-reach any agreement upon what, after all, is sent moment puts a strain upon the European concert. Though it is not easy to see where the hitch occurs, it is plain enough that it exists. Germany stipulates for the maintenance of the Sultan's supremacy, but not, as we understand, in any sense that would enable him to upset reforms carried out by the Rowers. Lord Salisbury has proposed autonomy on the Samian model, and HI.
Hanotaux appears to be in general agreement. There is no great difference between Loi Salisbury's plan and the views which G many has formulated aad which it is und stood she is willing to modify. Yet no agreement is reached, public opinion is impatient and incredulous, and moving while diplomacy stands still.
As a matter of fact, diplomacy, under the guidance of Lord Salisbury, was moving all the time, for on the 25th the Times wrote The Powers have adopted Lord Salisbury's principle that the future of Crete should "be settled before active measures are taken inst the Greek ships and forces. Now that this point has been agreed upon, the is to inform Turkey and Greece of sion of Europe, and to assure them in plain words that they will have to carry it out. A notification of the plans of the Powers is to be addressed to Constantinople. The Sultan is to be told that the Powers have undertaken the reorganisation of the island. It is to be expected that thereupon Turkey will withdraw her troops and her Administration, Greece at the same time will be called upon to withdraw her troops and her ships. Should she refuse todo so, measures of coercion will be at once resorted to, including, if neces-cary, the blockade of the Pireus proposed by the German Emperor. It will be seen irom our Athens telegrams that, while the two most in-Auential" Greek papers advocate a policy of submission to Europe, a great deal of wild and dangerous talk is being used in other quarters. Threats of resistance to the decision of the Powers and of carrying war into Macedonia are being recklessly employed. We are not inclined to attribute undue importance to these outbursts. Greece has brought herself into a difficult position, but after all she may console herself with the reflection that the force to which she will be summoned to yield is overwhelming, and that her action—lawless and Dlameworthy as in many respects it has heen—has undeniably accelerated the liberal tion of Crete from the direct rule of Abdul Hamid. The emergeaco of the Cretan problem into a comparatively hopeful stage can brin nothing but profound gratification to all of the Great. Powers. It is a great diplomatic success, by which the representatives of all of them, and not least the representatives of Great Britain, have earned the gratitude of all who love peace.
On the 26th the Times showed with more detail what the Powers really proposed with regard to Crete 'The Powers intend to give Crete adminis. trative autonomy" upon one or other of various models offered by different portions of the Turkish Empire. 'The autonomy, us Lord Salisbury intimates, can scarcely be' set
tory to ardent friends of Crete. The Greeks all at once in a form completely satisfac will be required to withdraw with all convenient speed, and, in the prevent temper of Petersburg and Berlin, will not meet with much toleration if they demur or hesitate. The Turks will afterwards be required to withdraw as the new organisation gets into working order. They will at once be deprived of real power over the domestic affairs of the Cretans, but they will be useful ime from a police point of. view, and they will afterwards retain a certain show of suzerainty, just sufficient to satisfy the requirement' that the integrity of the Ottoman that the Greeks, notwithstanding much bad Empire shall be respected. It may be hoped advice now offered them, will sce the wisdom of acquiescing in the arrangement Powers. They will certainly suffer not. When they are cool enough to we various elements in the situation they will see that their attempt to seize upon Crete runs counter to the settled policy of Russia, and for that reason, if for no other, to the policy of every Power that desires to maintain They need not abandon the hope of some day getting possession of Crete, and it may reconcile them to delay to remember that the inhabitants of that island may easily be made under European care a much more desirable set of subjects than their warmest admirers can reasonably think them at present. Tt is said sometimes that Cretan autonomy is imsible, and there is too much reason to think that it will be fairly turbulent. But that is the affair of the Cretans, who will at
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.