The following article from the Jiji Shimpo on the need for the extension of Japan's navy will be read with interest at a time when so many rumours are abroad s to the intentions of the Government either to contract or postpone the scheme Our object in demanding the extension ofthe navy is merely for the purpose of self-defence, to avoid the danger of war, and to maintain the security of the Em: pire, and nothing more. It may be said that, if such be the object, the existing naval scheme will be quite sufficient, and there will be no need of extending the nary by an additional 200,000 tons, making its total strength 400,000 tons. In our opinion the existing scheme cannot secure the naval supremacy of Japan in the Far East; it will place it only on an equal footing with a possible enemy, and the country could not therefore feel free from danger. Japan's scheme for the extension of her armaments is well-known to the whole world. The plan is to provide standing army of 500,000 and to be in a position in a time of emergency to send abroad at a moment's notice an army of 200,000 or 300,000. East of the Suez Canal there is no other country but Japan able to do that, Wo are assured that, even if two or three of the strong Powers of Europe combined to. attack Japan, we are in a position to prevent the landing of a single soldier on our shores. This thought is reassuring to the Japanese nation. Ta considering the naval scheme, we shall find that it aims at bringing up the total displacement of the fleet to not more than 200,000 tons in the next six or seven years, It is very doubtful whether a navy of 200,000 tons is sufficient to secure the safety of the country and avert the danger of a war. In discussing the question of warfare, it is necessary to imagine possible enemy and compare its. strength of armaments with our. own. Viewed from the present position of affairs, Russia, France, and Germany are apparently allied,' and the united force of the navies of the three allied Powers in the Orient seems to be equal to our own naval force. _If both sides fight with the existing force, Japan has no cause to fear the combination, but the allied Powers may feel the same. The Kinochou affair is not sufficient to provoke the outbreak of a hostile feeling on the part of the Japanese nation, but in the event of there being any subsequent developments which will nob admit of Japan remaining silent any longer, it may perhaps impel Japan to challenge the three Powers and wage war against them, as the naval scheme is now almost completed and the spirit of the people is very active, Should Japan by good fortune prove victorious and crush the squadrons of the allied Powers, repeating thy vie-tory of the Yellow Sea, it will be a very happy omen for Japan. It must be borne in mind, however, that the enemy is not China,' but the strong Powers of Europe. The Chinese navy collapse! in one fight;_but it will not be so with the European Powers. They would soon equip other squadrons without a doubt. The Japanese navy will doubtless suffer very heavy damage in the first fight and lose one-half of its fighting power, and if the second squadrons of the enemy appeared before the repairs of the Japanese squadron were completed, the result can be imagiaed. It would therefore be extremely hazardous for Japan to fight the allies, with her navy only equal to theirs in strength. Suppose Japan were able to rout the second squadrons of the allied Powers, could Japan rest at her ease? No, not at all.
ere is a still greater danger. The British navy is most formidable
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.