The American nation has the right to expect that the President will exact a full equivalent from Spain for our sxcrifices made. No sentimental thought should have any room in the conditions of peace imposed by us. The only considerations worthy of statesmanship are the future requirements of the United States, modified solely by expediency. In order to impress the President's mind and make it responsive to proper sugsestions, it is our duty to call to h attention the many grave mistakes pre-ussly comunitted by him and his Cabinet, when following his or its judgment..It would he unjust if we did not mention that the President as well as his Ministers have since endeavoured to do their duty conscientiously, thole efforts and abilities, however, often' falling short of the necessary requirements. Among the most serious shortcomings of our Government were:
1,—Postponement of hostilities till this Sprin:
ack of ability in the State Department.
3.—Retention of a civilian as Secretary of War.
4.—Retention of a civilian as Secretary of the Navy.
5.—Lack of able technical advisers in all Departments.
Let us consider seriatim these charges and their consequences.
Ad. 1.—As early as last fall it was evident to everybody with the slightest military and diplomatic training, who had followed the course of events closely, that Spain was absolutely unable to crush the rebellion or. that it would voluntarily evacuate Cuba, alternatives insisted upon by our Government. A postponement of action on our part till Spring was unadvisable for a number of reasons, but absolutely criminal in view of the danger of yellow fever to our army of invasion in "tropical territory during the summer months. Each case of yellow fever among our troops is directly chargeable to the neglect or want of ability of the President. His eventual excuse, that it had been his intention to postpone the time for the commencement of operations till next fall, but that this plan had been forcibly changed by the Maine incident, is fallacious, as a statesman should take unexpected incidents into consideration.
Ad. 2.—The lack of ability in the State Department in our negotiations with Spain before the war had been so conspicuous, that any further reference to it is super: fluous; the simple statement, that the nominal head of the Department was mental wreck, being sufficient.
Ad. 3 & 4.-The retention of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy in their respective positions instead of replacing them by allo Military and Naval pficors and placing all subordinate departments of the Army and Navy directly under the control of such officers, was a crime. Directly traceable to this crime were the unpreparedness, inefficiency, and delays in the ordnance, ' equipment, commissariat, and medical bureaux, etc., and also the frictions between Army and Navy Commanders, all of them unpardonable offences and impossible under proper military chiefs Ad. 5.—While the President in the selection of Secretary Day, Assistant Secretary Moore, Capt. Mahan, etc., has made some excellent appointments, there is still a serious want of technical advisers: in all departments, thus augmenting the: dangers pointed out in the previous para-
After this short review of the most glaring errors committed, we hope that the President will now rise to the occasion and insist upon the following While no indemnity needs to be exacted, the terms of peace should include cession by Spain of 1. Cuba.
2. Porto Rice.
3. Ladrone Islands, 4. Caroline Islands.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.