Witt the occupation of Komati Poort the regular warfare in South Africa has come to an end. The scattered guerilla bends still in the field may give further trouble. But the operations must now be regarded as police rather than as military. Since the initial engagements at Talana and Elandslaagte many unexpected things have happened, and many calculations have proved totally erroneous. That in any great war this should be so is almost inevitable. Peace soldiering affords little guidd as to how events will shape themselves in war, and reputations in warfare are invariably lost or gained with bewildering rapidity. Few realise how ar-nous is the work of a general in the field. The intellect and knowledge which go to make the strategist are less difficult to find than the peculiar collection of qualities which go towards making the successful tactician, In war more than in any other affair of life the man who hesitates is lost. The successful commander must possess foresight, tact, an iron constitution, unruffled composure, a certain callousness to suffering in others, and a combination of dash and caution, which is rarely found in one individual. How far in these respects have our commanders succeeded, and how far has the plan of campaign been justified by results?
When war became imminent, the military strength of the British Empire was represented in South Africa by some six battalions of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and a few guns—a totally inadoquate garrison even in ordinary circumstances. To reinforce it a division collected from India and the Mediterranean was dispatched to Natal—a proceeding which disturbed existing arrangements as little "s possible, since, in the ease of troops despatehed, mobilisation was not. necessary. Lamentable as the situation in Natal soon became, it might well have been considerably worse but for their arrival. The Government delayed matters till the last maoment, and even the buying of an adequate supply of horses was put off till after the war had begun. When Sir George White reached Natal, ho found there a dangerous dispersion of troops, and it was certainly more a matter of luck than good management that the advanced force at Glencoe escaped a disaster. But even after the first engagement the gravity of the situation was searcely realised, and it was thought that with the return of Yule's column to Ladysmith all would still go right. Up till then the conduct of affairs at Ladysmith had been well carried out—la any case Sir George White had no option but to hold it—subsequently however an unduly ambitious attempt to break up the Boer concentration resulted in the di-master at Nicholson's Nek. Yet out of evil in this case perhaps good came. For the 1,200 men who were then captured enabled the supplies at Ladysmith to last longer than they otherwise could have done. In any case the mistake can readily be forgiven on account of the heroic defence of Ladysmith which followed, and proved Sir George White to be a superb leader of men. Meanwhile in England a larger British army than had ever before taken the field was being mobilised. Large, however, as it was, it proved totally inad-to the Russian Empire; and we incline to equate tg the needs of the situation. The original plan was the landing of a division at Cape Town, Port Elisabeth, and East London respectively, after which a concentration was to take place in the South of the Free State. The advance to the Transvaal was then to be made through Bloemfontein, and the Natal army was to join it on the way northwards. How long in reality it took to effect this concentra: tion is a striking proof of the uncertainty of war. On arrival at the Cape Sir Redvers Buller found the situation in Natal and in the West so alarming that, instead of trusting to the automatic relief of Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking by his advance northwards, ho broke one of the cardinal rules of strategy by abandoning his main object for subsidiary exigent cies. Ho despatched a division to the relief of Kimberley under Lord Methuen, a skeleton force under General Gatacro to the centre, and the remainder under General Dory to Natal, whither be shortly afterwards followed. His plan proved a failure and his own reputation—though ho has since proved himself a good subordinate commander—and that of at least two of his three divisional commanders suffered considerably. Each force was too weak to undertake the task entrusted to it, and in each case there was a lamentable absence of cavalry and artillery—which with as-rounding stupidity had been despatched from England after the infantry. The result was that the horses of what mounted troops there were, were called upon to make exceptional ' exertions while still suffering from the effects of their sea voyage. About this period a loyal offer by amada and Australia of perhaps the finest scouts and mounted infantry in the world was with an incredible lack of foresight refused by the Government. In the West, Lord Methuen was beguiled by the Boers into fighting four costly battles which resulted in nothing, and one of which was an unmitigated disaster. General Gatacre, too, fared no better, though in his case it must be admitted that he was given a handful of men to perform an impossible task Simultaneously with these failures, Si Redvers Buller was himself repulsed in his attempt to force the passage of the Tugela at Colenso, and Spion Kop and its attendant scandals followed soon after. Division after division was despatched to his assistance. But each as it arrived was scattered orer the whole theatre of war and, while one massed at some particular spot might have effected something, the plan adopted made each useless, Thus when Lord Roberts arrived in January, he found chaos everywhere. A large British army was there, it is true. But nowhere was there to be found a single mobile Yot above all a field army was necessary, and to its creation Lord Roberts and Kitchener applied themselves with bril success. In the issu the gdvanco to Bloerafontein was a triumph of organisation rather than of strategy and tactics. Some exceedingly brilliant work was, however, accomplished by the cavalry under General French. But. the difficulties inseparable the Fapid advance soon made itself felt, The cavalry horses suffered severely, and {an untimely outbreak of enteric fever strained the hospital resources to the wtmost. Among other things the advance to Bloemfontein had the effect of withdrawing the Boers from Ladysmith, who with unpardonable lethargy were not followed by Sir Redvers Buller's cavalry.
A long delay followed, which was marked by some of these "regrettable incidents" with which this war has made us so familiar, and. which must be attributed mainly to the ill-timed leniency and. misplaced confidence with which we have treated the Boers. At last Lord Roberts decided to advance northwards. As the Orange Colony yas by no means clear, he left Rundle's
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.