Tt will be remembered that while this Hay-Pauncefote treaty first greeted master-stroke of diplomacy on the part of the Scerctary Hay, criticism soon appeared on the ground that since the United States was to pay something like $20,000,000, which would be required to build it and for its maintenance as well, they should have proprietary rights in it with the privilege of fortifying it and of closing it, if desirable, in time of war. This opinion gained adherents steadily and found able and powerful supporters in the Senate when the treaty came before that body for ratification or rejection. It was impossible to obtain the requisite two-thirds vote to rati ty as it stood. There was no idea of rejecting it, however, for the Spanish war had shown the necessity of a canal. A middle course—that of amending the treaty, with the hope that Great Bi would accept the amendments—was adopted. Three amendments in all were made. One struck out the invitation to other maritime nations to concur in the neutralizing of the canal. Another provided for the entire abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The third, and most important, known as the Da amendment, expressed, in general language, the right of the United States to adopt such measures in regard to the canal fas were deemed necessary for the proper maintenance of American authority. This, of course, meant fortification provided this were found to be desirable.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.