London, 23rd November, 1897.
That the foreign policy of Lord Salisbury is a failure has long Leen evident to those who have had facilities for looking into the Aetails of the proceedings of the Fore'gn Office. It has been said for more than a year, to my certain knowledge, by some of the most strenuous supporters of the G verament, that Lord Salisbury was incor petent to direct the conduct of orel Affuirs,. and that his continuance in the direction was a menace of disaster. 'That he has lost nerve and grown timid and hesitating is of common knowledge, but the history of his actual tenure of the Foreign Ofice' shows it (in fall knowledge of the difficulties and advantages of the situation) to have been one of the weakest which the recent annals of English government afford. What must be said in his defence, however, is that the late Government, by its fruitless attempts to arrive at a good understanding with France, and its perpetual and weak concessions to French assumptions, had so
lisbury had little ground to stand on for ely compromised the position that the preparation of his defence.
The pressure of public opinion on account of the Armenian massacres brought, momentary energy into the decisions of the Foreign Office, and the fi st act of the Minister was to re-establish the old accord between England, Italy, and_ Austria, originally made in 1888, when Crispi and Salisbury were in power, for common action in the Turkish Empire. Italy accepted the renewal of the programme of action eagerly, as Crispi's ambition had always been to bring Italy into a definite alliance with England; but Austria, bound by theagreement and unable to refuse, still accepted with reluctance, arising from the fact that she was not prepared for the raising of the Eastern question, which would have been the inevitable consequence of the actuation of Salisbury's programme. 'There was, too, in official' circles, the further reason for reluctance in the feeling that it was rather for the Austrian Government to take the initiative ina question that lay its borders than for the English, so far away and animated only by sentimental considerations, which to the Eastern Powers were of so little weight. However, Austria yielded, even if reluctantly, and the rrogramme of the new triple alliance was in imperial word of honour that, whatever Imight be the consequences of the step, he would back Italy to the. last man, poetically putting England.at the head of a quadruple alliance, and making her the Arbiter of the settlement of the Eastern question In consequence of this disposition, Crispi: ordered the fleet to Smyrna in support the English, and mobilised " corps d'urmée: for debarkation in Avin Minor in support of any operations necessary in the Dardanelles or beyond, and the Austrian fleet was prepared for such operation as might have followed, though the naval force brought on the field of action by England: and Italy combined was irresistible by any possible opposing force. Certainly at this moment the raising of the Venezuela question by the United States was n grave embarrassment for Salisbury—not, as we supposed, from any fear of the United States, for England even alone has never shown fear of any combination, but because the event of a war between the United States and England is regarded by a lunge and influential portion of English people us such a disaster to civilisation, that only the gravest necessity should: drive England into it. With the support: of Italy, Austria, and Germany,.. who would have necessarily been England's allies in the case of any aggression by the United States, England had nothing to fear the long run, except from English sentiment; and in spite of the momentary check caused by the attention of the Foreign Office being absorbed by the Venezuela question, nothing prevented Salisbury from solving the question at Constantinople in a short, vigorous campaign, concluded before the American diversion could have come to ahead.
'At this juncture, however, the French Government intervened with' solicitations for postponement, in view of a combined action of all the Powers, with an apparently amicable pressure which Salisbury was nob strong enough to resist; nnd the naturally to be anticipated long discussions began, with interminable delays, with preparations and final intervention on the part. of Russia, and the ulterior consequence of a secret treaty between the Czar and the Sultan, which gave the former the effectual prote torate of the Turkish empire. The posi tion now became impregnable, except in the event of a general war, for which Salisbury had not the nerve nor England the desire. The opportunity was lost, but, what was much worse, the opportunity for future ce-operation of Germany with England was also lost. The contingent consequences of the weakness of Lord Salisbury were son felt in two directions. The German Emperor, exasperated at the way in which Salisbury had trifled with and betrayed the Triple Alliance in its representatives, Italy and Austria, especially the former, became hostile to England, and, to atone for having abandoned Russian interests, became clear to him that no reliance could be their most strenuous supporter, It was Emperor. was' compelled to become. the laced on the policy of Salisbury, and the supporter of all the plans'of the Czar; in
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.