In compliance with a request from Lieut. von Krohn, now in the German Hospital, a representative of the ¥ Japan Mail" has had an-interview with the gallant officer concerning statements attributed to him by a local paper. Lieut, vou Krohn has a bandage over his left eye, but is otherwise in good health and spirits. He speaks English well, as most German officers do, and the interview was conducted in that Language.
Lieut. von Krohn first explained that he had no notion that he was being interviewed when the representative of the "Japan Herald" called upon him simply thought it was a friendly. visit, and chatted in an informal mauner as he would have done to any compatriot who had happened to call." No notes were taken at all, and consequently some serious misstatements had been made in regard to matters on which the "Japan Mail" afterwards commented.
is the first point which you would like make clear?" asked the "Japan Mail the of Admiral Seymour' was 'a great mistake, and could only end in failure as it did, for his forces had no knowledge of the country, no maps, and only eight days' provisions, and above all very little ammunition. Well, the impression given by that is that I was criticising the wisdom of Admiral Seymour's action. German officers are not educated like that, to indulge in criticism of superior officers, and I had particularly no notion of speaking adversely of one so high above me as Admiral Seymour. T have such a high esteem for him that I could not possibly have said anything of the kind. What I meant to say was this: as events tumed out, the expedi tion proved a mistake, but neither Admiral Seymour nor anybody else could have foreseen what was to happen. At the time he started the railway was intact and the tele; raph to Peking was not interrupted. Nobody anticipated that we should find such resistance as we did. It was thought we should simply have to face the Boxers, and the expedition was planned merely to increase the garrisons of the Legations at Peking. It was only after Admiral Seymour had left that we had any idea of the amount of trouble we were likely to have. He left in the forenoon, and I with a body of Germans in the afternoon. When Admiral Seymour left the railway line was interrupted, but the telegraph wires were quite safe till about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. The Admiral took in his, tug some waggons with materials to repair the line. While our engine was detached for water we noticed that an attempt had been made to tear up the rails between it and the carriages. That showed that the Boxers were active about tientsin itself. What I said to the interviewer was that if Admiral Seymour had known, or if any of us had known at the time, what a great amount of resistance would have to be encountered and in what manner the railway would be destroyed later on, he would never have started. It would have been a great mistake to have left Tientsin, where we were all wanted. But it was impossible for the Admiral or any of us to see that, and I have not had the least idea of criticising his action. We were all agreed as to its wisdom in the circumstances as we then knew them. We joined him about 8 o'clock the same night, some 30 li from Tientsin, where he had stopped to mend a bridge which had been destroyed by fire. A railway building had also-been burned."
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.