£9th June.
Tr was good news that reached us yesterday afternoon through the agency of Mr. Tratman, the British Consul at Chefoo, and Mr. Pelham Warren, the British Consul-General here, that the relieving force which started from Tientsin on Sunday last to the assistance of Admiral Seymour has been successful, and that it has brought the gallant Admiral back to Tientsin. He must have had heavy fighting, for it was telegraphed that he has 62 killed and 312 wounded, a large proportion of the two thousand men of all nationalities that left Tientsin on the 10th and lith instant, with the hope of reaching Peking and succouring the foreigners there. It is evident now that Admiral Seymour's force never reached Peking. Without sufficient supplies and with little or bad water, the leaders of the expedition have evidently found it impossible to push through, and they would probabl have found themselves at a Teadlock if they had reached the gates of Peking. There is no doubt that the Chinese regular troops have joined the Boxers in opposing Aumiral Seymour's march. It is reported on very credible authority that an imperial decree was issued a few days ago, praising the Boxers for their courage in opposing foreigners. The Manchus, it seems, have burnt their boats; they have justified the warnings we have been repeating for some months, that the ring that has got control of the Enipress Dowager is ignorant enough and conceited enough to think that it can effect the Song-desired expulsion of foreigners, for which purpose the regular troops were to be the body and the Boxers the wings.
Meanwhile there is a general idea that, notwithstanding the failure of Admiral Seymour's expedition, the foreigners in Peking are still safe. It was stated here yesterday that chinese official news had been received that they were still unharmed on the 29th. This, it would seem, must be the 29th of the Chinese moon or the 25th of June. This contradicts the latest report received from Chefoo yesterday, that they had been ordered to leave Peking, we presume with an escort-—for even the present ruling peuple in Peking cannot entirely ignore the sanctity of legates—and that they are coming away by devious route. With so large a force as has been landed up to date at Taku, 16,000 men, with reinforcements arriving daily, it should soon be possible to send an adequate force up to Peking and ascertain the truth. The Boxers and the regular troops who are co-operate ang with them are not after all so very formidable: for Admiral Seymour's was only a small force, and yet the Chinese were unable to attack it successfully; while, considering that a considerable garrison must have been left in Tientsin, it cannot have been a very much larger force which has brought Admiral Seymour's column back to Tientsin. It is very gratifying to sec all the Powers putting aside their differences and heartily ce-operating for the restoration of order in North China. This ce-operation is most important and most valuable. If there is ary high official in the provinces with a tendency to waver, the knowledge that all the Foreign Powers are united is more likely than anything else to dissuade him from showing his ant-foreign proclivities. It is stated, indeed, that the latest Chinese news from Peking shows a change in feeling there since the receipt of the news of the gathering of a great international fleet at Taku, and the certain early arrival of troops from so many different points, inspired by the one intention of putting a stop to the licensed anarchy in Peking. The danger is now that there will be a sudden volte-face at Peking, and that the Foreign Powers will be told that the supposed encouragement of the Boxers is alla mistake—anu the edicts in reference to them have been framed very ambiguously—that the Government is sincerely anxious to protect foreigners, especially missionaries, and that any appearance of hostility is due to the mistakes of subordinate officials. But our Governments must, we hold, make up their minds when they come to settlement, to unitedly disclaim any territorial compensation; to banish from office altogether the Empress Dowager and her gang of Manchus; to remove the capital of China to Nanking; and to put Kuang Hsii on the Throne again, if he can be found.
We cannot do better in this connection, than quote from a scries of three brilliant articles on "The Chinese Problem," very recently contributed to the London "Morning Post" by "One Who Knows'—and of this there is no doubt. He says A word in conclusion as to the forces of national sentiment among the masses in China, which must necessarily exercise a potent influence on the future of our position there.
From telegrams that appear in the newspapers an impression may not unreason ably be created that native feeling in China is, as a whole, hostile to reform and to the introduction of railways and foreign innovations.
This is not the case. Intercourse with non-official classes, and, indeed, with many provincial officials who are not immediately under the blighting and intimidating influences of Peking, brings out two facts very clearly to he observer on the spot.
First, that the masses of China are in favour of reform, and are anxious for the opening-up of the country by railways and mines, and, secondly, that they entertain the strongest feelings of loyalty and sympathy towards their virtually deposed Emperor, whom they continue to regard as their lawful Sovereign, while they look on the Dowager Empress as an usurper. For instance, there is no reason to doubt, indeed there are the strongest grounds for lieving, that most of the mil ways for which concessions have been obtained in China, if granted unrestricted foreign management, would be availed of freely by the masses, would pay handsomely, and would he quite independent, fin: Government guarantee of interest. {The only guarantee necessary for their complete success would he a guarmtee of immunity from Chinese official interference, and the danger to be apprehended from wanton rowdyism, existing in all countries, and by no means to an unusual degree in China, could be efficiently and safe y provided against by a small force of railway police, officered by Europeans, for the preservation of order at the stations and the prevention of theft on the railway lin There is, in short, no doubt whatever in the minds of those who are ina position to jude that the masses of China are ripe that it is only present. intimidate policy of the Empress, dictated by fi ud forced on the country by her metro lo advisers, that blocks the way to prog Itwas nothing short ofa grave blunder on the part of Great Britain and the other Powers who have the welfare of China at heart to have permitted the coup d'état which resulted in the virtual deposition of the Rmperor, and the blunder culminated in their consent to take part in an audience given by the Empress to the diplomatic ies, which had all the effect designed by her of an official recognition. Of cause, the blunder is irrevocable, though possibly not_irretrievwble. No one who is quainted with the inner history of the coup of the autumn of 1898 will seo any doubt that the action of the Dowager Empress on_ that occasion was dictated more by fear for the safety of her petain andi of her wealth th by the mere love of power.
person of her Majesty was divulged by conspimey to place restraint on the the Chinese General, Yuan Shih-hai, who had been admitted into the secret by the Emperor's party, and who, it was arranged, was to lend the'assistauce of his foreign-drilled troops for the carrying out of the scheme.
The Empress acted promptly, with the result that is known to history, and thereby created for herself a position which she niust now find intolerable.
Surrounded by intrigue and terrified by the constant fear of rebellion, which appears to be, snoner or later, the inevitable issue of the policy to which she is committed, it is hard to imagine that she would not regard the prospect of a resignation of her power, under proper guarantees for the safety of her person and of her property, as a happy release from her anxieties, &.esignition which, in point of fact, could he effected with a perfect regard to her own dignity and to the requirements of Chinese custom by the simple issue of an edict announcing that the young Emperor, being happily restored to health, is able ence more to re~ sume the reins of government, Any Power, or combination of Powers, which directed efforts to the ae' omplishment of this end by firm pressitre and tactful diplomacy would have the people of China a its back; they would strike the deepest note of national feeling. in that country, and would earn thereby an influence and a prestige which would enormously imitate the subsequent task of advising and supporting the reinstated Emperor in the course of reform to which he has alread cly pledged himself by his acts.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.