The whirligig of time has evolved many strange and unexpected situations of late, but assuredly no one ever thought that so distressful a patriot as Mr. Michael Davitt would be found vindicating the intelligence Department of the War Office. Yet Mr. Davitt has been the more or less unconscious instrument who has partially rehabilitated Sir John Ardagh and his subordinates in the esteem of their countrymen. For eighteen mouths the Intelligence Department has had to endure in silence the snyers of military experts, and the scorn of that opinionated individual, the man in the street. Now we learn, with Mr. Davitt's assistance, that the Department was not entirely an abode of ignorance so far as South Africa was concerned. Te-seems that in June, 1899, four months compiled in Section 1 of the Inence Division of the War Office. Tt was called Military Notes on the Dutch Republics of South' Africa," and was endorsed " Secret." Its preface was written by Sir John Ardagh himself. A certain nitmber of copies of the work were issued to officers in the field when the war began, One copy was captured by the Boers, Mr. Davitt was with the Boer forces at the time, and obtained possession of the book. He hus since written an account of its contents for an American newspaper. Other copies have now found their way into the hands of certain people in England, From the published extracts, it is tolerably clear that the Intelligence Department, at any rate, was under few delusions ubout the strength of the Boers. Some leading facts culled from the book suffice to establish this assertion, It may be noted here that the unanimous testimony of those who have seen it is that it is an able document, clearly written. It estimated the total number of Transvaal Boers liable to military service of 29270, and of the Free State Boers at 22,314. ho number of colonists from the Cape and Natal who would be likely to join the enemy was set down ut 3,000 from the Cube and 1,000 from Natal." The total forces which Grent Britain would have to meet in the event of war was estimated at between 55,000 and 56,000. This proved in the event to be fairly accurate, and the portion liable to be detained out of this number for p garrison, and farm duties, was also computed with approximate correctness. It is not in knowledge of numbers alone that the prescience vf the Intelligence Department is amply vindicated, One of the strongest pleas advanced in its own defence by the present Government is that the intrusion of the Otunge Free State into the fight was wholly unexpected, and completely upset its calculations. lhe damning disclosure of Sir John Ardagh's compilation entirely overthrows this allegation. In June, four months before the war, the Intelligence Department had printed'a solemn warning that the Free State would fight. Let us luce aide by side a passage from " Military Notes" and an extract from a speech made by Mr, Balfour in the dark days during the investment of Ladysmith.
There can be no If I had been ask-question that if war ed two months ago ensues between the whether it was likely Transvanl_and the we should be at war suzerain Power asa with the Orange Free result of the differ- State I should have ences made apparent said, "You might as at the Bloemfontein well expect us to be Conference (1899) at war with Switzer-the Free State, who land." (Cheers,) has alrendy declared certainly did not by the mouth of her realise until a very Rand that she et short period before ly approves of Pre- the war thit the sident Kfuger's pro- Orange Free State would throw all their edly throw in her lot forces into line with with the sister Rethe Transvaal Re-ublic.—"* Military publie.—Mr. Balfour Notes" (p. 45). at Dewsbury, end of November.
Thus it is placed on rees that a leading member and prominent apologist of the! Government was entirely unacquainted with a fact of vast importance, which was fully within the cognizance of the Intelligence Department. But the case ayuinst the Government can be pressed still farther. This secret publication—so secret that the Cabinet seems t" have been blissfully unconscious of its existence—actually disclosed in June, 1899, the plan of campaign which the Boer allies ultimately followed. The public have been toll with wearisome iteration that the beleaguerment of Ladysmith, and even the invasion of Natal, were developments which could not ha been anticipated. From the mo ent that the Free Staters aebouched through Van Reenen'x Pass ints Natal, Ladysmith was in danger; and it has been specifically asserted that their advent was unexpected. But the ligence Department had clearly intimated that Ladysmith would he imm diately threatened, xs the following extract fom the Manchester Guardian's" article on the secret document sufficiently shows Speaking at Manchester on the 8th January, 19:0, Mr. Balfour said that the Ladysmith entanglement was beyond the "calculations we could be expected tofore." But in a footnote on p. 52 of the Military Notes" 9 report from a reliable source dated June, 1899," is mentioned, according which the Transvasl Boers intended to concentrate with thy Free State forces west: of the Drakensberg and to advance on Ladysmith through Van Reenen's Pass. The Government, moreover, is warned on 19 of the "Notes" that the mobilisation of the Boers would be rapid; and we have soon that a trustworthy estimate of the strength of the Boer forces was made by the War Office. Warned on all these pom's, the Goversment yet imagined that Sir George White's army would be able to hold its own in the open field against twice the number of Boers in a country so pre-eminently favourable to Boer tactics and unfavourable to the development of our strategy as Natal (p. 49 of the Notes"), Even this humiliating revelation does not sum up the tale of the sins vf omission committed by the Government in disregard of the infornmtion accumulated and printed by the Intelligence Department. It hak frequently been represented that the existence of the famous Long Toms" was unknown in London, and that their appearance at Ladysmith and elsewhere filled every one with surprise. The following parallel passages carry their own moral The Stoats Art- When the noble killery have in posses- Earl (Lord Kimber-sion four heavy bat- ley) says that we teries, each battery must have known consisting of four about the artillery Creuxot B. 1. guns and munitions of 15cm. (about war that the Re-Gin.) with pneumatic publics were intro-recoil, weight about ducing, I ask how S0ewt., and exrryon earth we were to ing shells of about know it. I believe, 94lbs., including the as a matter of fact, bursting charge of that the guns were Sib. of melinite. fired generally introduced with a charge of in boilers and lo-about 201b. of black comotives, and the munitions of war Notes," p. 24. were introduced in piano-ease sand tubs.—Lord Salisbury, House of Lords, 30th January, 1900.
Not only were the compilers of " Military Notes" fully aware of the existence of the Creusot guns, but they had foreseen that they might be used away from the forts, Mr. Balfour expressed at Manchosthe Government at the novel use of "guns of greater range and less mobility." In the previous Juve, the Intelligence Department had declared that " the Creusot guns mizht possibly be made use of outside the forts as guns of position, although their mobility "is slight." Even the enormous quantity of rifles in the Transvaal was amply within the knowledge of the Department, which had further announced that all bub 13,500 Martinis had been purchased since the Jameson Reid. The necessity for large numbers of mounted infantry was set forth an able essay on Boer tactics included in "Military Notes." Could anything be more pregnant with warning than the following compendious sent-nce? "South Alrica is of all countries perhaps the most [dangerous in th+ world for infantry operate in without a screen of mounted troops in their front and on their thinks." Yet the Colonies were told "unmounted men preferred."
The cheerless tule of ineptitude does not invite prolonged attention; but the few passages quoted help to indicate that the Intelligence Department has been unfairly assailed, Its maps were not above reproach, but it foretold with unerring precision the war strength of the Boers, and their probable plan of campaign, "The printed pages of these Military Notes" show that the Iwelligence Department did its work well. Net the least of the many ets upon the Government policy during the war has been that nota word has been so in. official circles to relieve the Department of the odium at where did the fault lie? isation? If the system under which the blunders of the war becrme possible stood condemned before, itis thrice damned now. When France went to war with Germany its Intelligence Department Nroke down; when Great Britain became involved in war in South Africa, its Tntelligence Department was in excellent working order—only no one seems to have taken the trouble to study the informa tis it had collected, 'Therefore we bought hones in Argentina instead of from the Cape farmers, ant clamoured for infantry from colonies where every man can ride, The publication of this' secret volume ks anew and remarkable phase in the series of revelations of our unprepared "Times of India."
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.