7th January.
Ir is certainly to be hoped that the considerable concessions which, we are assured, have been made to Japan by Russia, and are embodied in Russia's answer, will be acceptable, for nothing can be better for us all in the Far East than that war should be averted by Russia's yielding to Japan's moderate demands, It is possible, after all, that Japan will recede from her request for a catetorical reply; that she will be persuaded to give Russia still more time to remedy the notorious unpreparedness of her forces in Manchuria; and that she will be deterred from action by the threat that on her will be the responsibility of striking the first blow. Tt is possible, again, that a much heavier responsibility will be on her ifthe does not strike the first blow. It is not necessarily the Power that gives the first blow on whom the responsibility rests, but the Power that by a long course of provocation, and especially intentional provocation, obliges another to seek redress or forfeit' her honour and imperil her future career.
We know fairly well what Russia's proposals amount to; that she shall not be interfered with in Manchuria and the northern half of Corea, and that Japan shall have her way in the southern half of Corea, Unless Japan has changed her policy, these are proposals she cannot possibly accept. Her creed is, and in this she is supported by Great Britain, that the open door must be maintained in Manchuria, and that it must remain' a Chinese possession; and that the integrity and independence of Corea must be respected. She cannot possibly be an accomplice in the partition of Corea, and tat Russia should make her the offer is almost an insult. According to the German telegram that we publish this morning, "both in Berlin and in Paris the best-informed circles assure as that any warlike measures taken by Japan in South Corea would not be a case of war for Russia." Of course not, for they would be used to justify all that Russia has done in Manchuria and North Corea. The Japanese, it seems to us, have gone too far to be arrested by these counter-proposals and suggestions that the negotiations shall be continued at St. Petersburg the statesmen of Tokio know that time is on Russia's side, They know too that if they remain firm, the "coming-on disposition" of Russia is more likely to grow than to disap-ear, Russia does not want to fight, now that Phe than risk a war in for all her preparation; and it seems the Far East, she will, as soon as she receives an ultimatum, accept Japan's demands. If she does, Japan will have to get guarantees that Russia's recoil is not made now in order that she may in a little while make a better spring.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.