At this time the guns of four German Army Corps were in position against them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that} he judged. it impossible to oontinue his retirement at daybreak! (as ordered) in face of such an attack.
I sent him orders to use __his' utmost endeavours to break off the action and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable of movement.
The French Cavalry Corps, un-dor Genera] Sordét, was coming up on our left rear early in the moming, and I sent un urgent message to him to do his utmost to come up the} and support the retirement of my left flank; but owing to the fatigue lof his horses he found himself unable to intervene in any way.
There had been no time to ea-trench the position properly, but} the troops showed a front to the terrible fire which con fronted them.
The artillery, although outmatobed by at least four to one, made a splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponente.
At length it became apparent! that, if complete annihilation was retirement 1 cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the Bri tish troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable services rendered by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.
I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing on the 26th August could never have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present personally to conduct the operation, The retreat was continued far into the night of the 28th and through the 27th and 38th, on which date the troops halted on the line Noyon-Ohauny-La Fore, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy's pursuit.
On the 27th and 28th I was much the] indebted to General Sordét and the French Cavalry Division which he commands for materially a6- sisting my retirement and—succoasfully driving back some of the enemy on Cambrai.
General D'Amade also, with the gist' and 6%md French Reserve Divisions, moved down from the neighbourhood of Arras ea the enemy's right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the British Forces.
Thix closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced at Mons on Sunday afternoon, 92, and which real ly constituted a four days' battle.
At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present despatch, The British Losses.
I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the British Fores have suffered in this great battle; but they were inevitable in view of the fact that the British Army—only two days after a concentration by rail—was called upon to withstand a vigorous attack of five German Army Corps.
It is impossible for me to apeak too highly of the skill evinced by the two General Officers commanding Army Corps; the celt-sacrificing and devoted exertions of their Staffs; the direction of the troops by Divisional, Brigade, and Rossi. mental Leaders; the command of the smaller unite by their officers; and the magnificent fighting spirit displayed by non-commissioned officers und _men given to commence it about 3.30 p.m. The movement was covered with the most devoted intrepidity determination by the Avtillery, which had itself suffered hea' and the fine work done by the Cavalry in the further retreat from the final completion of this most:
Fortunately self suffered too heavily to engage! in an energetic pursuit.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.