On the subject of the relative strength of the two armies in the Far East, the Russian Viedomnosti,", of Moscow. hrs recently published a most interesting article, which coming from " Russian s"urce s extremely significant. The author heginsfby alluding to the statement made by various Russian newspapers, including military magazines, that Japsn can put 1,000,000 men into the Geld. If this were really 60 we should have already lost the war, and our army would have to evacuate not only Manchuria, but Eastera Siberis as well," The writer goes on to give details of the} troops which Russia has in the field or on their way out, "Since the war began we have not sent out more than, in rund numbers, 240,000 men across Lake Baikal, an average of 35,000 men a month..,.. In a year we enuld not send more th to the Far East, so that nominally our force beyond Lake Baikal would reach a total of at most 750,000 to 800,000 men." Any li in the carrying capacity of the Siberian Railway (by the completion of the Circum-Baikal line and other measures) will be completely swallowed up by the doubling of the work necessary to keep the supply of ammunition and foods for an army twice as strong, to convey the sick and wounded to the base, and to rake good the wastage atthe front Japan has far better means of transport than Russia, and has thrown 400,000 men on to the mainland in seven or eight months, ' that is twice as many as we have got over the Baikal in the same period. Thus in the course of a year Japan could bring her strength up toa million men, whereas we could only concentrate 600,00: to 65,000 men in the period. In this case, no doubt, consider-Ing the splendid armament of his forces, no whit inferior to ours in point of courage, Marshal Oyama, having at his disposal a grent superiority of force, could win the campaign with comparative ease." The author, however, goes on to state that there is no reason for believing that Japan cxn raise an effective field force of more than 600,000 men, as any further troops would be necessarily untrained levies incapable of meeting regular armies, From this he concludes that the prospects of next year's campaign, when Russia will have 750,000. men to Japan's 600,00, are most favourable.
The latter part of the article deals with an aspect of the war little noticed by the foes Press—i.e., General Linie-expedition from Vladivostock into is movement, it seems, formed an important part of a's plan of campaign, for it was destined to Kimice (that advancing northward and tin between the two Japanese
that besieging Port Arthur) in the same way as General Sherman's force in the American Civil War marched round to the rear of the Confederates, who, passed by Grant on the north and Sherman on the south, were driven to the sea and compelled te surrender. General Linievitoh's expedition has, according to the writer, been s complete failure, and has consequently been suspended at the very beginning. This failure he attributes to the fact that the Japanese possess the command of the sea. "A campaii against Seoul and then on to the Yelu would be possible only if our fest, held the command of the Japanese Sea. -Then General Linievitch would have a short|ssid line of communication by Isnd (Gensan-Seoul, 180 versts), while from Gensan we should be in communication with! Viadivostock by sea But the Bal-was at "Fusan, the sea! tic Fleet is late, Admiral Jessen
the power of the Japanese, and the advance on Seoul with a land Tine of communications through mountainous country is impossible.
General Lineviteh's rear would be open to an attack from the sea."
This statement is extremely interosting as being almost the first allusion that has yet been made in the Russian Pross to the command of the ses. Russian writers have completely ignored this fact, although it has been the key-note of the campaign and the chief cause of the Japanese successes.—" Nagasaki Pross."
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.