INDEMNITY, The " Japan Mail}" publishes the following summary of.a lengthy account of the peace negotiations which Mr. Yamaza, one of the principal. members of Baron Komura's suite, has supplied to the "Nippon"
12th September.—Tho first Article was taken, namely, that relating to. Japan's freedom of action in Corea. The Russian ipotentiaries listened to the arguts advanced in support of Japan's but put forward and obstinately maintained some: conditions which Mr. Yamaza does not define, Baron Komura -and Mr.'Takahira rejected them most positively, and the Russians, abandoning them, confined themselves to asking that.tho! Russian, people: should receive: mos! favoured- ion treatment. Baron Ko mura was willing to..concede this so. far as the Russian people wore concerned, but declined in, the case.of.the Russian State. This dispute lasted until the Mime of: the' Conference's rising and remained unsettled, but after their return it hotel the Russian' Plenipotontiaries sent word that they accepted the Japanese proposals. 3 14th.—(One day's interval).—On this day the withdrawal of the-Japanese troops froni-. Manchuria, (Art. of mining privileges in Kirin province and of enterprises. at Mukden, both of which problems evoked vehement protests from the Russians, but finally Japan's terms: were conceded on the whole.
15th.—On this day Arts. IV., V. and VI. came up for discussion, Art. IV. related to the open door in Manchuria. This was settled without any special difficulty. But Art. V., the cession of Saghalien, proved the occasion of a strong discussion, The Russian Ple potentiaries insisted that to cede tei ritory was demanded only of a conquered Power and Russia was not yot conquered. Her armies stood intact in the field and she was prepared to continue the war.. Moreover, the island of Saghi the gate of the Maritime Province, and, further, any cession of territory would be an obstacle to the permanent peace of the two empires, The Japanese replied by a statement of the historical facts during the past 250 years, and claimed that this could not bbe called a cession of territory i as really a restoration, No sign of. yielding was shown by the Russians and After a controversy of some hours it was seen that an agreement could not then be reached, so the Article was deferred \deration.
'VI was taken. This to the lease of Liaotung. It had been expected that the Russians would here raise keen objections. Liaotung represented to them the realisation of their perennial policy of obtaining an ice-free port, and moreover they had spent immense sums on Dalny and Port Arthur, It seemed that they must struggle much more st the surrender of all this than they had struggled against the cession of Sagivalien. But -they had ntly made up their minds that on tung being m Japanes possession, havi deen. won sacrifice of thousands of Tapauese lives, and having already been unjustly wrested from Japan ten years previously. 'They offered few objections except on points. of procedure, #nd -the Article was disposed of without much discussion, -16.—Article VIL, the surrender of the Manchurian Railway, and Article VILL., relating to restrictions: upon' Russia's use of the portion of the line remaining to her; were the theme of discussion on this day.. The Russians contended stoutly. that the Manchurian Railway belonged to a private company which had received the concession from the Governments of China and Russia. It was therefore impossible that the road could be ceded direct to Japan. Moreover, whatever might be said about such portions of the line as were already in Japanese hands, no' proposal could be justly entertained as to the portion not yet so held. After much dispute it was finally agreed, however, that the section of the line south of Changchun should be handed over to Japan. The' condition that the railway should. not be used for purposes of military. transport! was accepted without. much discussion.
1ith—On this day the great. battle commenced. Art. IX.. stood first on the
indemnity. The same. day's. programme: pane namely, the Article relating to.an cluded Art. X, namely, ae surrender of termed ships; and Art. XI., relating to tthe limitation of Russia's naval forees in. the Far East. The. Russian Plenipotentiaries insisted as..to the indemnity that) their country was not, conquered; that her armies still held their ground; that indemnities, were never..paid except when the existence of the payer was threatened; -that even after, the fall of Sebastopol.there was no talk of indemnity; that to establish a title to an indemnity the Japanese armies would have to force their way to St. Petersburg, and that it would be far more to Russia's advantage to continue the war-than to be mulcted in the cost of continuing it at this stage. Concerning the surren:: of the interned ships and the limitati. of Russia's naval strength, their argument was simply that a great State like Russia could not possibly con sent to such humiliating demands. The discussion lasted from morning until evening without any prospect of success, continued throughout the 19th, the 23rd, and the 26th. Argument after' argument was adduced on each side and contention after contention was advanced. The only substantial result of this interval's work was that on the 18th the article relating to fishing privileges in northern seas was decided in Japan's favour. M. Witte now submitted " compromise and sought the consent of t:.e St. Petersburg Government, but the Czar telegraphed his total dissent from these Articles, and conveyed to the Plenipotentiaries an emphatic order to stand firm. The President of the United States frequently urged the Czar to yield, but his counsels produced no effect. Finally Mr, Witte abandoned all hope of a settlement. In effect, he gave up the case, with an expression of bitter regret that these long and patient efforts had borne no fruit. Japan had then to choose between two courses: sither to make a large concession or to continue the war at an immense cost of life and treasure, and without getting any nearer to an indemnity. There could be no doubt which plan would conduce more to Japan's best interests, and which pian was more in accord with the dictates of humanity. The great concession was made, and on the 29th of September peace was restored.
Mr. Yamaza concluded by referring to the rumour circulated confidently by American journals and apparently credited in some circles in Japan, the rumour that Baron Katieko.had acted over the: heads of the Plenipotentiaries as a medium of communication between the President and the elder statesmen in Japan.. There is not, said Mr, Yamaza, the smallest scintilla of truth in this story. It is a Jibel on the President, on the Japanese Government, on the' Plenipotentiaries, on the elder Statesmen, and on Baron Kaneko.
Another misunderstanding is corrected by Mr. Yamaza, namely, the rumour that the Japanese Government failed to convey its thanks to President Roosevelt, and that Baron Komura was thus considerably embarrassed. The fact is that the cable between Shanghai and Nagasaki.was interrupted -at that. moment, and the telegram suffered delay.in transmission. President Roosevelt was entirely cognisant of the facts" Kobe Herald."
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.