Jan. 29.
Exception has been taken to our Note & Comment of last Wednesday on the dangers of disagreement in the Conference of Allied Premiers now sitting in Paris to decide what Germany has to pay. "I do not wonder," writes a corespondent, ''that British journals feel it right to say hard and pointed things (about Germany) at times, in view of the past; but as time goes on I hope there will be less of that kind of thing, and more honest effort at reconciliation; the only real hope for the future lies in that direction." Curiously enough, the note objected to was much more directed against the conference than against Germany. But as the palpable uritrustworthiness of that country's government, the utter absence of any convincing pools that the old Pangerman spirit is dead and the many irresistible proofs to the contrary were certainly at the back of our criticism of the conference, it may be useful to try to define the attitude of the average Briton towards the German Government and German people, especially as there are certainly many Germans who read this paper.
Some months ago the ''North-China Daily News'? got into rather hot water with a good many readers for demurring strongly to the formation of societies designed to keep alive feelings of rancour against the German people, and for urging that, in our dealings with them individually, we ought to endea-your to forget, although it may be difficult to forgive. And to that view, at the risk. of incurring further displeasure, we adhere. On the other hand we say there are no signs that the spirit of the German Government has changed and that the Allies, in framing a policy towards Germany, must keep that fact in view. yw during the war it became very difficult to draw this distinction between Government and people. Yet we think that there were many who could never quite divest themselves of this idea, that a difference did or might exist; and with the restoration of peace they feel it more strongly than ever. Moreover it appears to be not merely the only feasible attitude to take, but the one that we ought to take, in order to arouse the German people to exert themselves to insist upon a change in that Government, which is as much a danger to themselves as there is reason to fear it would be to others, if and when it felt strong enough. We know there are many who will utterly scout the idea that any good thing can come out of Germany, affirming that, if. she went to war again, every German would act precisely as he did before. That is a debateable view, against which arise quite different recollections of private relationships with individual Germang in the old, kindly, pre-war days—the same recollections that made all the dark doings of the war as shocking as they seemed well-nigh incredible. About these paradoxes we might argue for ever and find no answer to the riddle. But peace has brought about a different set of circumstances; and because Wwe agree with the correspondent quoted above, that along "the avenues of human kindness'' lies the only prospect of converting a diplomatic into a real peace, we say that we must assume a different nature in the German people to that which is still so visible in their Government. It is unnecessary to recount in detail the proofs of bad faith and unaltered character that the latter have given: their repeated failure to keep the pledges of armistice and treaty, their secret armament still maintained, their exaggerations of the value of what they have paid, their pleas of distress and beggary while new capital ig being subscribed to German industrial enterprises by thousands of millions. It might almost seem as if the Kaiser still ruled from Amerongen. And if the German people do not realize, these things and how hopelessly they themselves are thereby alienated from the whole world, it is the duty of foreign writers to endeavour to arouse them. For the true revolution has yet to come in Germany and it can come only from within by the will of the people themselves.
doubt the Allies themselves ave greatly to blame for the German Government's behaviour. When the guns ceased fire, there were but two ways of dealing with Germany. The one was to recognize that her crime was so enormous that it could never be assessed by human means—for whatever reparation might be made in money, nothing could pay for the unutterable agonies which the war produced—and so, freely to forgive her all her debt. The other was to have inflicted swift andi condign punishment, so many ships and other machinery and so many millions of gold marks to be handed over, and an army of occupation in Berlin till all was done. Opinions may differ as to which in the long run would have proved the better wav. But there can be no dis-voting that the course actually chosen was as fatal to any good result as could well have been designed. Irresolution, delay, the alternation of sentiment and severity have naturally encouraged the German Government in the belief that it could play with the Allies as it pleased, and the result has been dissatisfaction for all. disputes and war bitterness still unassuaged. This is the situation that both Allied and German peoples have to face and the canker of Pangermanism and robbery will never be cut out of the German Government till it is frankly recognized by both.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.