In discussing the question of naval supremacy we adverted to the open letters addressed by Admiral Lord Charles Beresford to the Prime Minister on the subject of British preparedness in the event ofa naval war. The first letter set forth some of the facts of the present situation with regard to naval defence, and the conclusions that Lord Charles Beresford drew from them, namely, that the existing British shipbuilding programme is so inadequate that within three years British naval supremacy will be forfeited, and that a new Naval Defence Act, financed by a substantial loan, should at once be put into force. In his second letter, the fall text of which is now available, Admiral Beresford deals with an aspect of naval defence that may be regarded as lying apart from the political and strategical considerations mainly governing the strength and the distribution of the Fleet. He refers to the existing condition of international relations, and warns the Government that the British trade routes of the world are at the moment almost wholly unguarded, and that there exists no practicable arrangement whatever for providing increased defence in time of war. Our trade in the event of war would, he argues, be exposed to the attacks of privateers on all routes, with the immediate results of a sharp rise in the rates of insurance, in the prices of raw material and the necessaries of life, the refusal of shipowners to allow their vessels to leave port and a heavy' fall in the price of securities. The seriousness of exposure to such attacks is patent to every one. Although the first essential operation in naval warfare is to obtain what is termed the command of the sea, yet it is now possible that a nation that is incapable of obtaining such command, or has lost it, may prosecute successful privateering. For an analogy we may turn to the War in South Africa where, after Lord Roberts had driven the Boers out of all their towns, the British lines of communications were UN
263 constantly endangered and out were baraseed by small tds of the enemy. The guerilla warfare thus adopted materially delayed the termination of the war.
Thus by the resort to privateering an appreciable influence might be exercised on the result of a naval war; at all events the conclusion of hostilities would be seriously postponed. The abolition of privat~ coring was agreed to by the majority of Powers la the Declaration of Paris of 1856; bat the practice was permitted to be revived by Russia during the Russo-Japanese war, a an attempt has sines been the Declaration of Leotee of acd made to legalize privateerin
But whatever the legal aspect of the question, Lord Charles Berosford holds that we have an unmistakable indication of the policy to be pursued by foreign nations in the event of a maritime is scorely to equip swift morohani~ war, and he states that this policy men with guns and guns' crews prior to the declaration of war; to provide their captains with the necessary formal documents required to transform a merchant vessel on the high seas into s privateers and to telegraph orders to begin operations to all ports at a given moment. After the declaration of war, such merchant ships, until they were thus transformed into privateers could use neutral ports that were closed to actual men-of-war. It is evident that, if privat-coring were practised upon the trade of a country that was solfsupporting, the effect would aot be go serious, but in the case of a country that draws the greater part of its food and raw material from overseas, the immediate result might be to paralyzethe whole population before the main fleet could come into action. Privateering has been revived under conditions that enlarge enormously its powers to injure British trade; yet no measures of any kind have been taken by the Government to guard against this danger.
Whatever opinion may be held of Lord Charles Beresford's mothods of impressing his views upon the nation, it has to be remembered that he speaks with the authority of fifty years' distinguished service and that the course which he has adopted is virtually the only one open to him in the circumstances. He declares that every British trade route lies exposed to the attacks of privateers, and demon-strafes that the Navy is unable to protect trade in the event of privateering being resorted to by an enemy, if we should, unhappily, become involved in a maritime
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.