20th April.
We have received fiom Mr. Odagiri, the Consul-Cieneral for Japan, a copy of the Japanese white-book, containing a translation into English of the "Corresponience regarding the Negotiations between Japan and Russia (1903-1904)," presented in March last to the Imperial Diet. As the whole course of the negotiations was recorded from time to time in our columns; and as the whole discussion was simple in the extreme, Japan presenting her irreducible minimum at the beginning avd never deviate ing from it, except in unimportant' details, while the Russian Foreign Office met Mr. Kurino with little more than repeated evasion and procrastination, it is unnecessary to dwell at any length on the documents this white-book contains. The first Komura to Mr. Kurino, dated Tokio aper is a dispatch from Baron
the 28th of July last, asking the latter to express to Count Lams-dorf the desire of Japan for an understanding with Russia; to this Count Lamsdorff replied that he was in perfect accord with the view of the Japanese Government and that the Czar "would surely approve the matter." Accordingly, in a dispatch dated Tokio the 3rd of August, Baron Komura sent to Mr. Kurino the following as the basis of an understanding between Japan and Russi "1, Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Corean Empires and to maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in those countries.
"2, Reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Corea and Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and of th right of Japan to take in Corea and of Russia to take in Manchuria such mea. sures as may be necessary for the protection of their respective interests as above defined, subject, however, to the provisions of Article I of this Agreement. *"'"3,-Reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and Japan not to impede development of those industrial and commercial activities respectively of Japan in Corea and of Russia in Manchuria, which are not inconsistent with the stipulations of Article I of this Agreement.
"Additional engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the Corean railway into southern Manchuria so as to connect with the East China and Shanhaikuan-Newchwang lines, Reciprocal engagement that in case it is found necessary to send troops by Japan to Corea, or by Russia to Manchuria, for the purpose either of protecting the interests mentioned in Article LI of this Agreement, or of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create international complications, the troops so sent are to be forthwith recalled as soon as their missions are accomplished.
"5. Ri jon on the part of Russia of the exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance in the interest of reform and good government in Corea, including necessary military assistance.
"6, This Agreement to supplant all previous arrangements between Japan and Russia respecting Corea."
Mr, Kurino could get no opportunity to hand this project to Count Lamsdorff until the 12th of August and on the 23rd the Count said that he had studied it seriously and sent copy to Port Arthur for Admiral Alexeieff's report, The Czar had been away for a week at the manceuvres, and. perhaps it would be better to transfer the negotiations to Tokio. Baron Komura preferred St, Petersburg; but Count Lamsdorff gave several reasons for preferring Tokio, one of them being that "the Russian way of conducting business here is not very expeditious." Baron Komura gave way on the 9th of September, trusting at the same time "that instructions to the Russian Minister at Tokio are of such a character as to enable him to present the Russian counter-proposals. without delay and to proceed immediately with the negotiations." On the 22nd of September, Baron Rosen, the Russian Minister at Tokio, went to Port Arthur to prepare Russia's counter proposals in consultation with Admiral Alexeieff, and on the 3rd of October he handed them to Baron Komura as follows 1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Corean Empire.
2. Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests in Corea and of the right of Japan to give advice and assistance to Corea tending to improve the civil administration of the Empire without infringing the stipulations of Article I.
3. Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the commercial and indus. trial undertakings of Japan in Corea, nor to oppose any measures taken for the purpose of protecting them so long as ich measures do not infringe the stipulations of Article I.
4, Recognition of the right of Japan to send for the same purpose troops to Corea, with the knowledge of Russia, but their number not to exceed that actually required, and with the engagement on the part of Japan to recall such troops as soon as their mission is accomplished.
5. Mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Corea for strategical purposes nor to. undertake on the coasts of any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Corea.
6. Mutual engagement to consider that part of the territory of Corea lying to the north of the 30th parallel as a neutral zone into which neither of the Contracting Parties shall introduce troops.
7.. Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as in all respects outside her sphere of interest.
8 This Agreement to supplant all previous Agreements between Russia and Japan respecting Corea.
Aiticle VII was the crux of the discussion, Baron Komura contending, as explained in his dispatch of the 22nd of October, that "Japan docs not ask for any concession from Russia with respect to Manchurir, her proposal being simply to have confirmed in the Agreement the principle which has been voluntarily and repeatedly declared by Russia, Japan possesses in Manchuria her treaty rights and commercial interests, and she must obtain from Russia a guarantee for the security of these rights and interests as well as of the independence of Corea which would be constantly menaced by Ru: sia's definitive occupation of Manchuria." On the 30th of October Baron Komura presented to Baron Rosen the following as definite amendments to the—Russian counter-proposals 1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Corean Empires.
2, Recognition by Russis of Japa preponderating interests in Corea and of the right of Japan to give to Corea advice and assistance, including military assistance, tending to improve the administration of the Corean Empire.
3. Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the development of the commercial and industrial activities of Japan in Corea, nor to oppose any measures taken for the purpose of protecting those interests.
4. Recognition by Russia of the right of Japan to send troops to Coren for the purpose mentioned in the preceding Article or for the purpose of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create international complications.
not to undertake on the coasts of Corea 3, Engagement on the part of Japan any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Corea.
6. Mutual engagement to neutral zone on the Core: frontier extending 50 kilometres on each side, into which neutral zone neither of the Contracting Parties shall introduce troops without the consent of the other.
Recognition by Japan that Manchuria is outside her sphere of special interest and recognition by Russia that Corea is outside her sphere of special interest.
8. Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Manchuria and of the right of Russia to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of those interests.
9. Engagement on the part of Japan not to interfere with the commercial and residential rights and immunities belonging to Russia in virtue of her treaty engagements with Cores, and engagement on the part of Russia not to interfere with the commercial and residential rights and immunities belonging to Japan in virtue of her treaty engagements with China,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.