18th October.
Tue small newspaper that has lately been established in Tientsin with Russian money, and that has introduced itself to public favour under the name of the well-known and erudite magazine published for so many years in Hongkong, has an article in its issue of the 12th instant, headed "The Turn of the Tide," which is not of much value in itself, but is interesting as an indication of the expectations that were formed by the tians of Russia when General Kuropatkin issued his confident proclamation to his troops that the Czar had sent him adequate reinforcements and that the time to take the offensive had arrived. It seems a little hard to call this, as has been done, a thrasonical proclamation, especially when we know that General Kuropatkin was not following his own judgment, but was acting under imperative orders from the Czar. That notable invention of the nineteenth century, the electric telegraph, has been responsible for too many mistakes and disasters, and none have suffered more from it than diplomatists and commanders in the field. When a Moltke, or a Yamagata, is at one end of the wire, the men in the field at the other end may pay heed to it perhaps with advantage, but when it is a Czar with more self-confidence than knowledge, and no experience to sup his ignorance, the result is alms sure lo be disastroy To us who have now before us a part at least of the results of General Kuroparkin's unfortunate compliance with the Imperial command, the exultation of the "China Review" is indeed melancholy.
"At last," it says, "after many months of uphill and disheartening work, darkened by the abuse and misrepresentations of a servile subsidised anti-Russian Press, the glad news reaches us that the tide of the fortune of war has begun to ture; and that now, having been aufliciently reinforced, the Russian Commander-in-Chief is at last able to begin the offensive." Here, the writer is already going a good deal outside his instructions, He makes a serious mistake in allowing tha. it has been uphill and disheartening work, for we have been told all along by the partisan of Russia, that General uropatkin's repeated strategic movements to the rear were part of his original plan; that he set out with the intention of retiring gradually from Corea to Harbin, and gently tempting the Japanese to get as far as possible from their base, even if the process landed them in time on the shores of Lake Baikal. This, if was his plan, he carried out agsidyously, and to call it "uphill and disheartening work" is to throw discredit on Russia's greatest Genera'. Tt was strategy; uviuviting strategy at the time, but to be judged in time by its results; and the "uphill and disheartening work " came when the General was ordered by an incon-side rate sovereign to abandon his plan and start off on an entirely different task. The "China Review" continues: "A forward movement which is, singularly enough, synchronous with the commencement of the Japanese retirement." There is not really very much singularity in this, because it is almost a truism that two bodies cannot occupy the same space, and if one moves forward the other must retire. "Thus," the writer continues "is General Kuroparkin's strategy justified and his soundness of judgment proved, and their final consummation will not be very far off now." It is quite true that General Kuropatkin's soundness of judgment has been proved, but not in the way the writer proph: sies. The General's strategy and judgment. were to go on retiring, and disaster has overtaken him whenever he allowed his judgment to be overruled, and thus indeed his strategy has been justified and his soundness of judgment proved. It will be better for the Caar if he hereafter refrains from interfering with the designs of his Commander-in-Chief.
"We wonder," says the "China Review," "what kind of screeds we shall see issued by the Japanese and lied journals after this, as an excuse ah lonment of the alumate yeu's cunpaign, as stated otticiaily over and over again, viz, the occupation of Mukden, and its retention as " starting-point for the new campaign to be organised next year?" To talk of abandunment is a little premature, considering that the Japanese are considerably nearer Mukden now than they were on the 12th, when the "China Review" was published. By the by, we believe the editor of that paper professes to be an Englishman end is therefore one of Japan's allies, and his sneer at "the Japanese and allied journals" seems tu lack something of patriotism ani good taste. We need not follow him in his jibes at the Japanese for not having yet taken Port Arthur; his concluding be "hae" adopted the cause of the ragraph shows how heartily
Russians, as might be expected from a man who was with the Boers at Majuba, and with the English in the late war. He says: " With a crippled army and navy, a poor financial outlook, the change in feeling which has come over Great Britain and America, and the certainty that all they have done up to the present in Manchuria will prove futile, we cannot congratulate Japaa upon the outlook. M's-calculations may be made by even the cleverest of Generals; but it must be admitted that the Japanese commanders have gone beyond their tethers, and they will now find that having to retreat with a strong army following them up is quite a different form of warfare to their hitherto successful advance." Such an experienced campaigner ought to have remembered the danger of prophesying unless you know.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.