The following is the text of the letter from the correspondent of the "Times" who accompanied the Royal Tour in India, Which excited such keen hon it was published, five London. ttotapts of some rail Capital out of the victory which he has won oppoisents of the grave'conk tional changes involved in his sche' Of Army Acmidiatration, Mr. Merle decision is loyally accepted in Indis jen by those who still have serious iagivings as to the efficacy tke restraints placed on the Com~ mander-in-Chief. Moreover, though the best avd most éxpertenced opitiion in, India réinainis whalterably convinced of, i with which the jate Cabinet is certain fooling of wesriticss ly auipervaned in i éoritro~ versy of which yon in Todia many' people have been unable to follow the details or grasp the Bearings. In a far as Lord Kitchener's scheme tov to strengthen the hands of the military, ds agninst'the civil power, it naturally val' to the military instincts of very soldid®'; and to'that extent it has, no doubt, "sways commanded the sympathy of many distinguished officers, while the ipilitary tense of discipline which a masterful Commander-in-Chiot loss to bring home to nates has ultimately overdo:
hesitation of home who wore question, however, there li of much more inimediately practical character, which has been too often lost aight'of in the maze of theoretical discussions—naniely, how far the on-4 upon the ace to the efficiency of the native army.
0 position of the Tudian Army is peculiar one. It is, of course, an important part of the fighting machinery of the Empire, both for defence against foreign aggression and for thie repression of disorder, within the frontiers of Thdia, Bat it is'much more than that. It is one of the most valuable finks. between the ruling sud "faces. ' Front the ésrl our connection with our good fortune to win o Ty to our service all the most 1 races of India, within a very short time after they had fought stubbornly, but unsuccessfully, against us, Military service had been tradition with them from times immemorial, and as soon as they had been taught to r the supremacy of the British power, they transferred their service to it with all their old loyalty and prowess on the one condition that their customs and ions, or, if you like, their pre should be treated with consideration. The belief, widespread though erroneous, that that condition was being broken was one of the main causes of the Mutiny. The rative army in Iudis is thus essentially a voluntary army in a much higher sense than our British Army, into which recruits are for the most part"dtiven: tinder the pressure of social conditions almost s compelling as the laws which enforce obligatory, service on the continent of Europe, The vast majority of our Indian soldiers join under no such compulsion, but merely because they have been born for gancrations to the profession of grins, which kas had,
Attraction of adequate and regular _pay. Roroover, under British rule the added All the beat British officers in India have invariably applied themselves to encourage that softiment; and as military service, especially in the field, suturtily develops a closer sense of comradeship: than kny form of cooperation" in civil lif relations have wu up between: nat irish ' officers more friendly' than between any other elections of the' British "and nai corhmunities. {ti this sensi the loyalty of our Tndish Afmy is not ority the priniary condition of its 6ffisiehoy, but lao one of the greatest moral aa wall' og material assets of thie British Raj.
Unforturtately there is only too ranclr reason to believe that this is 'a factor which Lord Kitchener had failed altogether to appreciate: aid Horoin lion more'than more alterations of idthiniatrative muchinory, which some of hie most temperate critics appréh inctoased powers entrusted to thie'Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kitchener's attitude towards the native Army has created both within and outside ita'ranks the impression that he holds it in' very slight esteem, and that ho regards its peculiar customs and traditions with impatience as sonéoless obstacles to the homogeneity of ah ideal army. The mere neglect of personal courtesies which native officers have hitherto been Acoustomed atid the absence of those kindly manifestations of comradeship which endeared so many of his predecessors to the Indian Army woulit not alone have siufticed to create that impression had not various suggestions emanating from headQuiartors tended also to'arotise apprehensions of far-reaching changes in the organisation of the Itidian Army. Many of these suggestions were doubt. loss merely specul ud were wisely absidoned even before they had tak sufficient to be formal records. Bat, never went beyond th they could still be overtaken by official denials, they went far enough to create an atmosphere of dis rust and alarm which the denials failed to dispel. For, unhappily, Lord Kiteboner at the same time overlooked, or underrated, the effect upon the native army of some of the moat important features in his scheme for the redistribution of garri-Whatever the technical ary. opin to diveres the native soldier more and more from his home, and to rend more difficult and loss frequent. th periodical visits on furlough which he has hitherto been able to pay to his very large proportion of and pecul soldiers and officers are married, this is a very serious consideration. The Indian Army saw in the renumbering and renaming of its regi-monts two years ago a firet step towards the destruction of the old territorial connections which it valued for practical as well as sentimental reasons; and in the gradual elaboration of Lord Kitchener's redistribution scheme it sees evidence of the same policy.: Nor are even pecuniary grievances:
leid-days und camps of exercise' dnd grand manceuvres have been nauitiplied, and, from the point of view: of -suldiering efficiency, these are exeallent But forthe native soldier i involves severe drain-on his slender pittance in the mere extra wear and tear of his uai-Mormond equipment which: he.has to make good out of his pay.
'The discontent and unrest to which all'these circumstances have combined to give rise may for the present: be re—fleated only in the' reluctance: of old soldiers to re-engage and in the: uificulty of obtaining recruits, or. at -lesst recruits' of the same quality, though those are in themselves symptoms of 00 small sigoifioance, especially in roginiente which have prided.themeelves hitherto that the services of the recruiting officer wore never required to fill up their ranks. "But it is somewhat om-mous that nowhere dace greateranxioty prevail us to the potential dongon of a headstrong regime, ignorant or careless of the feelings of the native army, thi among educated and loyal natives,.who are for more familiar than Zecopeans can possibly be with.the real soutimeiite of their kiasmen with the colours.
Lord Kitehener's friends oan hardly deny thet his maxsterfalnoss geown: with increasing power; and, in'other matters than those immediately affecting. the Tadian Army, the orders which he often hastily issues and as hastily withdraws no longer show the samoiadastry kad application to detail or the aame devation to economy which characterised his work fu Rgypt, Sul lee cat his friends deny that ho-has no personal kaowlodgo ofthe Indian character; for he has never had any Indian experienc and, arriving for the firat India as Commander-in-Chief, he has not had the opportunities of oom: ng into: contact with Indian life which most of Pyossoewsore had found in the earl is constitutional intolerance of all opposition unfits him to learn from those who have had the experience which he lacks. In fact, with regard both to the Indian Army and to the question of army sdminniratiay Lord itohoher's views, which are: generally assumed to have boon on his nonce since he came to Indic, wore raught with him ready-made' from Jand, and. within a few woaks after hho bad landed at Bombay, ho expressed them during the Delhi Durbar s elbly as at any time since, Facte have bona made to Bt in with them, imagine that Lotd Kitchenir' susie.
But that is not all. Map:
ful reorganisation of the ~Byyptian Army in itself wbundsntly proves his eapscity to deal with native troops. They forget, as he himself apparently forgets, the difference between a conscript army composed of Egy fellaheen'and handful of Soudaneso tribesmen, such as he commanded in Egypt, and an essentially voluntary army composed of score of different fighting cestes, all equally proud of their ancient traditions liar customs, such as he now commands in I Another factor which largely contributed: to his success in Egypt—and for which now loss than ever can avy effectual equivalent be provided in India—was the restraining and directing influence of Lord Cromer's experience and wisdom. And what is leas generally known—for there were excellent reasons at the time for the utmost reticence—the great success
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.