The Archive · 1915

Great Britain and the Demands of Japan

London, March 11.

In the House of Commons Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said that Tsingtao was still in the hands of the Japanese military authorities. As the result of communications with the Japanese Government, access to the port was allowed to a certain number of British vessels.

In reply to another question Sir Edward Grey said: "We are not in a position to make statement with regard to the negotiations proceeding between Japan and China." London, March 13.

In the House of Commons yester day, the Hon. Neil Primrose, Par. liamentary Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, replying to Mr. P. A. Molteno (Lib, Dumfriesshire), said that the Japanese demands to China filled two categories. The larger constituted an attempt to settle questions which had been outstanding for years: the smaller was an attempt to ascertain China's attitude if Japan formulated certain demands to Germany at the end of the war.

The latter, as contingent demands, could not be described as violating the principle of the Treaty between the Allies that none of them would formulate any demands till the end of the war.

Generally speaking the British Government, had no objection to the expansion of Japanese interests in China provided that that ex: pansion did not prejudice British interests, "We have admitted that we would not apply for any concessions in China which affect the South Manchurian Railway and we naturally expect that Japan will show iprocity and not apply for con-jone which affect British interests.""

If there were any reason to suppose that the negotiations between China and Japan could not be settled by diplomatic methods and if there were a prospect of developments that might impair the independence and integrity of China, then, no doubt, consultations would take place to see how what was due to Japan could be secured without impairing the independence and

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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